Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 52

Issue 3

Article 18

Summer 6-1-1995

Challenging Episodic Practices Under Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act: Critical Analysis of Ortiz v. City of Philadelphia Office
of the City Commissioners Voter Registration Division
John A. Earnhardt

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Law and Politics Commons

Recommended Citation
John A. Earnhardt, Challenging Episodic Practices Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act:
Critical Analysis of Ortiz v. City of Philadelphia Office of the City Commissioners Voter
Registration Division, 52 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1065 (1995).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol52/iss3/18
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington and
Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law
Review by an authorized editor of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more
information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

Challenging Episodic Practices Under
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act: Critical
Analysis of Ortiz v. City of Philadelphia

Office of the City Commissioners
Voter Registration Division
John A. Earnhardt*

We wish we knew exactly what a plaintiff must prove m order to prevail
under the Voting Rights Act.
- Richard A. Posner'

Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (Act) is the major statutory
prohibition against voting-related discrimination.2 Designed to enforce the

Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution,
the Act covers a vast range of activities that affect voting.'

Section 2 of

the Act is the mechanism through which plaintiffs may challenge a practice
or structure that discriminates against minorities.4 Section 2 lawsuits most

commonly challenge the drawing of a particular political district and claim
that the challenged "structure" dilutes the voting strength of mmon* I wish to thank Professor Allan Ides for his valuable suggestions and Professor
Laura Fitzgerald for her encouragement and enthusiasm for this project. Special thanks go
to Barbara Earnhardt, whose unwavering belief in her children supports all my efforts.
1. Barnett v Daley, 32 F.3d 1196, 1201 (7th Cir. 1994).
2.

SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, VOTING RIGHTS ACT EXTENSION, S. REP No.

417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1982) [hereinafter S. REP No. 417], reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 207; see also Thornburg v Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 45 n.10 (1986)
(holding that § 2prohibits all forms of voting discrimination and is not limited to vote dilution
claims).
3. See S. REP No. 417, supra note 2, at 30, reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N at 207
(reporting on scope of amended § 2 of Voting Rights Act).
4. See id. at 2, reprnted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 179 (reporting that amended § 2
prohibits voting practices that result in discrimination).
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ties.5 Courts typically refer to such cases, which constitute the vast majority

of section 2 litigation, as "vote dilution" claims. However, section 2 also
applies to discriminatory behavior that affects voting and access to the

political process, even though that behavior does not involve permanent
structural barriers like those that arise in the vote dilution context. 6 Courts

refer to such actions, which represent a small portion of reported section 2
litigation, as "episodic" practices. 7
In Ortiz v City of PhiladelphiaOffice of the City Commissioners Voter
Registration Division,' the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit considered a section 2 challenge to the application of Philadelphia's
nonvoting purge statute. 9 The facts of Ortiz and the court's treatment of the

plaintiffs' section 2 claim present important questions for future section 2
plaintiffs that challenge episodic practices and inform the discussion of

various models for the section 2 cause of action.
In Part I, this Note briefly discusses the importance of voting, the

history of minority disenfranchisement in America, and congressional
responses to this disenfranchisement. Part II.A analyzes the Voting Rights
5. See generally Chisom v Roemer, 501 U.S. 380 (1991) (holding that § 2 applies to
judicial elections); Thornburg, 478 U.S. 30 (holding that § 2 vote dilution claim requires
evidence of racial bloc voting).
6. See Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 45 n.10 (holding that § 2 does not apply only to vote
dilution claims, but prohibits all forms of voting discrimination); S. REP No. 417, supra note
2, at 30, repnnted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 207 (explaining that § 2 applies to episodic
practices). Section 2:
prohibits practices which, while episodic and not involving permanent structural
barriers, result in the denial of equal access to any phase of the electoral process
for minority group members.
If the challenged practice relates to such a series of events or episodes, the
proof sufficient to establish a violation would not necessarily involve the same
factors as the courts have utilized when dealing with permanent structural
barriers.
[The ultimate test would be
whether, in the particular
situation, the practice operated to deny the minority plaintiff an equal opportunity
to participate and to elect candidates of their choice.
Id.
7
The Voting Rights Act expressly outlawed a number of common episodic practices,
including literacy tests, good moral character tests, and poll taxes. Voting Rights Act of
1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b & 1973h (1988). Examples of moder episodic practices include:
treatment of voters at polling places, location of polling places, registration procedures, and
application of purge statutes.
8. 28 F.3d 306 (3d Cir. 1994).
9. See Ortiz v. City of Phila. Office of the Comm'rs Voter Registration Div., 28 F.3d
306, 314 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that § 2 requires evidence that challenged practice caused
minorities to be unable to elect their chosen representatives).
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Act of 1965 and the early federal court decisions interpreting the Act. Part
II.B examines the 1982 amendments to section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.
Part II.C analyzes important cases defining section 2 protection after the
1982 amendments. Part IlI critically analyzes Ortiz. Part IV examines
various models for section 2 causes of action challenging episodic practices.
Part V concludes that the law is unclear with regard to what constitutes a

cognizable prima facie case challenging episodic practices under section 2.
Part V then proposes that courts recognize a bright-line distinction between
the proof necessary m episodic practice cases and that necessary in vote

dilution cases.
L Voting and Minority Disenfranchisementin Amenca
vote.

One cannot overstate the importance of assuring individuals the right to
0 Courts often proclaim that voting for the candidate of one's choice

is the essence of a democratic society " Restrictions on that right therefore
strike at the heart of representative government."

Historically, disenfran-

chisement has prevented minority voters from influencing elections.'"
Commentators suggest that this lack of political influence has reduced governmental accountability to minority groups. 4 Thus, fair and open political
10. See generally Harman v Forssemus, 380 U.S. 528 (1965) (holding that Virginia
requirement that voters either pay poll tax or file certificate of residence violated TwentyFourth Amendment); Yick Wo v Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (discussing importance of
voting as fundamental political right preservative of all other rights).
11.
See Shaw v Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2822 (1993) (holding that plaintiffs stated
Equal Protection claim because North Carolina redistricting plan was so irrational on its face
that it could only have been motivated by race) (citing Reynolds v Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555
(1964) (defining basic vote dilution principle)); Harman, 380 U.S. at 537 (discussing
importance of voting as fundamental civil right); see also Morris, Black Participationand The
Distribution of Public Benefits, in THE RIGHT TO VOTE: A ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION
CONFERENCE 164, 171 (1981) (reporting on causes of lower black voter turnout).
12. See Harman, 380 U.S. at 537 (discussing importance of voting) (citing Reynolds
v Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964)). See generally ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, Book II (Earnest
Barker trans., 1946) (discussing participation and democracy). Aristotle wrote that "[i]f
liberty and equality, as is thought by some, are chiefly to be founded in democracy, they will
be best attained when all persons alike share in the government to the utmost." Id.
13. Cf. Morris, supra note 11, at 168 (reporting that blacks make up only 11% of
United States population, but are concentrated so as to make possible formulation of cohesive
black agenda). Four factors explain low black voter turnout: (1) structural or procedural
devices that discourage voting, (2) black perceptions of futility due to past exclusion from
voting, (3) socioeconomic characteristics of the black population, and (4) political styles
within the black community Id. at 171.
14. See Steve Barber et al., Comment, The Purging of Empowerment: Voter Purge
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processes are critical to increasing the political influence of minorities and to
improving government's responsiveness to minority concerns.
Traditionally, minorities in America have faced numerous obstacles to
their exercise of the right to vote.I" Although blacks enjoyed unprecedented
political empowerment during Reconstruction, this power quickly eroded as
states developed methods of miimizm g the political influence of minority citizens.1 6 Voter registration, for example, developed in the late nineteenth century as an effort to disenfranchise both Southern blacks and new lmmigrants
to the Northern states. 7 Throughout the South, beginning in the late nineteenth century, use of the grandfather clause, good moral character tests, and
literacy tests had a devastating impact on minority exercise of the franchise.' 8
Laws and the Voting Rights Act, 23 HARV C.R.-C.L. L. REV 483, 485 (1988) (connecting
governmental accountability to group's ability toinfluence elections).
15. See S. REP No. 417, supra note 2, at 5, reprinted in 1982'U.S.C.C.A.N. at 182
(discussing history of discrimination in voting); Bass, Election Laws and Their Manipulation
to Exclude Minority Voters, in THE RIGHT TO VOTE: A ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION
CONFERENCE 1, 3 (1981) (reporting that First Reconstruction Act of 1867 required former
Confederate states to guarantee universal male suffrage before being readmitted to Union);
Barber et al., supra note 14, at 484 (recognizing that after gaining franchise, blacks
encountered numerous obstacles in exercising that right).
16. See Mississippi State Chapter, Operation PUSH v Allain, 674 F Supp. 1245,
1251-52 (N.D. Miss. 1987) (detailing history of registration and other voting procedures used
to deny blacks right to vote in Mississippi); United States v Louisiana, 225 F Supp. 353,
368-69 (E.D. La. 1963) (recounting Louisiana's adoption of grandfather clause to disenfranchise black voters); Peter R. Teachout, Louisiana Underlaw, in SOUTHERN JUSTICE 57, 61
(Leon Friedman ed., 1965) (reporting that black registered voters in Louisiana outnumbered
white registered voters almost 2 to 1 during Reconstruction); Barber et al., supra note 14, at
486 (reporting that during Reconstruction black registered voters in Louisiana outnumbered
white registered voters due to disenfranchisement of Confederate veterans and newfound
opportunity for blacks to register); see also Guinn v United States, 238 U.S. 347, 363-67
(1915) (holding grandfather clause unconstitutional).
17 See Voting RightsAct: Runoff Primariesand RegistrationBarriers:Hearingson the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 and its 1982 Amendment Before the Subcomm. on Civil and ConstitutionalRights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 136 (1985) (testimony of Lai Gumier, Voting Rights Litigation Project, NAACP Legal Defense & Education
Fund); Barber et al., supra note 14, at 485 (recognizing enactment of registration laws as
attempt to disenfranchise minorities); see also J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS: SUFFRAGE RESTRICTION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A ONE-PARTY SOUTH

1880-1910 48 (1974) (examining disenfranchising effect of Southern registration laws).
18. See United States v Louisiana, 225 F Supp. at 363-81 (recounting history of
disenfranchisement of blacks in Louisiana). Literacy requirements were particularly effective
at disenfranchising blacks due to the lingering effects of slavery Barber et al., supra note
14, at 486 n.17 For example, slave codes had forbidden slave literacy and did not provide
sufficient educational opportunities for blacks. Id. Additionally, literacy tests were not
administered fairly, and officials often allowed illiterate whites to vote by meeting property
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These efforts- effectively eliminated minority political participation before
coming under attack during the civil rights movement.
Efforts to disenfranchise blacks increased in the South in response to
Brown v Board of Education"9 m 1954, as politicians continued to fear the
In response to the
unrealized potential of black political participation.'
continued disenfranchisement of minorities, Congress enacted a series of civil
rights statutes designed to facilitate minorities' ability to vote.2 These statutes
allowed private parties to challenge discriminatory practices.' Tis legislative activity culminated in the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 3
I. The Voting Rights Act of 1965
A. Early Application of the Act
Congress intended for the Voting Rights Act to address America's history
of discrimination and the accumulated effects of that discrimination.' After
the Act became law, federal courts heard numerous vote dilution cases and
value exceptions. Id. Registrars often aided whites by correcting errors on their registration
applications while eliminating blacks based on similar errors. Id. at 486-87; see generally
United States v McElveen, 180 F Supp. 10 (E.D. La.) (discussing disproportionate
disenfranchisement of black voters m Louisiana), aff'd sub nom. United States v Thomas,

362 U.S. 58 (1960).
19. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
20. See DAviD J. GARRow,PROTEST AT SELMA: MARTIN LuTHER KING, JR., AND THE
VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965 9-10 (1978) (discussing white resistance to civil rights
movement in South); see also Teachout, supra note 16, at 64 (reporting Southern efforts to
disenfranchise minority voters).
21. See Barber et al., supra note 14, at 487-89 (discussing series of civil rights statutes
that Congress passed between 1957 and enactment of Voting Rights Act of 1965). After civil
rights statutes creating a private right of action to challenge discriminatory barriers to voting
failed to facilitate increased black registration, Congress recognized that "the burden of
overthrowing a state or political subdivision's obstructionist voting process could not rest
upon the individual." Id. Barber concludes that "[tihe futility of case-by-case litigation led
Congress to shift the responsibility for voting rights enforcement to the Department of
Justice." Id. at 489; see also S. REP No. 417, supra note 2, at 4-6, repnnted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 181-83 (discussing history of civil rights statutes and Voting Rights Act of
1965).
22. See Barber et al., supra note 14, at 488 (noting congressional recognition of futility
of private enforcement of voting rights and congressional support for Department of Justice
enforcement).
23. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-1973bb (1988).
24. The express congressional purpose of the Voting Rights Act was "not only to
but also to deal with the accumulation of
correct an active history of discrimination
discrimination." 111 CONG. REc. 8295 (1965) (statement of Sen. Javits).
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actively protected minority voting rights.' Section 2 of the Act addresses
episodic practices.26 Section 2 provides in part:
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or
procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision
in a manner which results m a denial or abridgement of the right of any
27
citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color
The legislative history and expansive language of section 2 illustrate that the
Voting Rights Act applies to all forms of discrimination, including episodic
practices.' Section 2 necessarily applies to all forms of voting discrimmation because amended section 2 provides protection commensurate with the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. 29
Even after enactment of the Voting Rights Act, states had broad power
to regulate the conduct of federal and state elections.3" Nevertheless, federal
courts developed a number of important principles for evaluating state elec25. See generally East Carroll Parish Sch. Bd. v Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976)
(holding that plaintiff must show evidence of discrimination in context of totality of
circumstances to prevail under § 2); White v Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973) (holding that
minority voters must show evidence that political processes are not equally open to prevail
under § 2); Whitcomb v Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971) (upholding federal court's power to
order redistricting); Hadley v Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50 (1970) (holding that unequal
treatment was harmful in any election regardless of officials selected); Allen v State Bd. of
Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969) (holding that change to at-large voting scheme was within
purview of § 5 preclearance); Burns v Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966) (holding that
districting scheme did not violate Equal Protection Clause); South Carolina v Katzenbach,
383 U.S 301 (1966) (holding that courts should give Voting Rights Act broad interpretation);
Zimmer v McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973) (finding that at-large election scheme
diluted minority voting), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. East Carroll Parish Sch. Bd. v
Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976) (per curiam). But cf. Wells v Edwards, 409 U.S. 1095
(1973) (holding that one person, one vote principle did not apply to judicial elections).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1988); see Barber et al., supra note 14, at 517 (discussing
§ 2's application to episodic practices).
27
42 U.S.C. § 1973(a).
28. See S. REP No. 417, supra note 2, at 30, reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 207
(discussing application of Voting Rights Act); see also Thornburg v Gingles, 478 U.S. 30,
45 n. 10 (1986) (holding that § 2 prohibits all forms of voting discrimination, not just vote
dilution claims).
29. See Chisom v Edwards, 839 F.2d 1056, 1061 (5th Cir.) (holding that § 2 covers
judicial elections), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 955 (1988).
30. See Roudebush v Hartke, 405 U.S. 15, 25 (1972) (upholding Indiana's power to
conduct recount of ballots in Senate election to guard against irregularity and error); Oregon
v Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 125 (1970) (holding that states have broad power to regulate state
elections except when limited by Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Nineteenth, or Twenty-Fourth
Amendments to Constitution).
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toral practices. For example, the Supreme Court established a "one person,
one vote" principle based on the view that the right to exercise the franchise
freely preserves other basic rights.3 1 The Court also applied strict scrutiny
to alleged infringement of the right to vote,32 but refused to find the use of
multimember districting schemes unconstitutional per se. 33 The Supreme
Court held that section 2 required only a showing that a challenged procedure produced an invidious result.' The proper standard in section 2
cases, explained the Court, was whether the districting scheme was designed
to have or did in fact have an invidious effect on minority voting rights.3 5
Additionally, the Supreme Court later made clear that the fact that minorities

are not represented proportionally does not in itself constitute invidious
discrimination or a constitutional violation.36 Finally, in the leading vote
dilution cases, the Supreme Court did not focus on the existence of an intent
37
to discriminate.

j

The Supreme Court departed from this established precedent in City of
Mobile v Bolden.3" In Bolden, the Court determined that evidence of dis31. See Reynolds v Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964) (defining basic vote dilution
principle).
32. See id. (defining basic vote dilution principle).
33. See Fortson v Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965) (holding that multimember
district did not on its face violate Fourteenth Amendment); cf. Rogers v Lodge, 458 U.S.
613, 616-17 (1982) (holding that at-large electoral system was maintained with discriminatory
intent); City of Mobile v Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66 (1980) (holding that Fourteenth Amendment violation requires showing of discriminatory intent); White v Regester, 412 U.S. 755,
765-66 (1973) (holding that minority voters must show evidence that political processes are
not equally open to prevail under § 2); Whitcomb v Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 142 (1971)
(finding that district court could order redistricting to comply with Voting Rights Act).
"34. See Bums v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 88 (1966) (holding that plaintiff can prevail
under § 2 by showing invidious result of challenged practice).
35. Id. at 89. The language of the opinion clearly established that § 2 plaintiffs could
prevail in either of two ways. Id. Plaintiffs could elect to show evidence that the electoral
practice was designed to discriminate, or plaintiffs could forego proof of intent and show the
discriminatory result of the challenged practice. Id. See generally Abate v Mundt, 403 U.S.
182 (1971) (holding that multimember districting schemes will be struck down if they result
in impairment to minority voting strength); Harris v Siegelman, 695 F Supp. 517 (M.D.
Ala. 1988) (discussing establishment of § 2 violation based on either intent or results).
36. See White v Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 764 (1973) (holding that there is no right to
proportional representation); Whitcomb v Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149 (1971) (holding that
no evidence of discriminatory intent is required for plaintiffs to prevail under § 2).
37 See Nevett v Sides, 571 F.2d 209, 232 (5th Cir. 1978) (Wisdom, J., concurring)
(explaining operation of intent in Fortson v Dorsey, 379"U.S. 433, 439 (1965), and Bums
v Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 88 (1966)).
38. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
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criminatory intent was a necessary element of a Fourteenth or Fifteenth
Amendment violation.39 The Bolden Court found that because Congress intended for section 2 to provide protection commensurate with the Fifteenth

Amendment, a section 2 violation must necessarily include discrimnatory mtent. 40 Bolden was a clear departure from the established "totality of

the circumstances" analysis4 ' and provoked an immediate congressional
response. 42
B. 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act
In response to Bolden, Congress amended section 2 to make clear that

plaintiffs need not prove discriminatory intent to succeed m challenging
an electoral practice. 43 Amended section 2 restores the pre-Bolden legal

39
City of Mobile v Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (plurality opinion) (holding that
plaintiffs failed to show discriminatory intent necessary to establish Fourteenth or Fifteenth
Amendment violation). In Bolden, the Supreme Court considered a challenge under § 2 of
the Voting Rights Act and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to Mobile's at-large
system of electing its governing three member Commission. Id. at 58-59. The district court
held that the Mobile system violated the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and the Fifth
Circuit affirmed. Id. The Supreme Court found plaintiffs' § 2 claim irrelevant because the
effect of § 2 is not different than that of the Fifteenth Amendment. Id. at 60-61. After
reviewing a number of cases involving the right to vote, the Court concluded that discriminatory intent is a necessary element of any Fifteenth Amendment violation. Id. at 61-65. The
Supreme Court next reviewed numerous cases involving Equal Protection claims and concluded that discriminatory intent is a necessary element of any violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 65-74. Finally, the Court discussed but rejected Justice Marshall's argument that discriminatory impact is sufficient to establish a violation m vote dilution cases. Id. at 75-80. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for further proceedings. Id. at 80.
40. Id. at 61-65. This conclusion reflects the holdings of two important cases involving
racial discrimination in employment. See generally Village of Arlington Heights v Metropolitan Hous. Dev Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (holding that proof of discriminatory intent
is required to establish Fourteenth Amendment violation); Washington v Davis, 426 U.S.
229 (1976) (holding that plaintiff must prove discriminatory intent to establish Fourteenth
Amendment violation); see also Paul Brest, Forward:In Defense of the Anti-Discrinmation
Principle, 90 HARV L. REv 1, 24-25 (1976) (discussing Supreme Court cases reaffirming
that evidence of disproportionate racial impact alone does not trigger strict scrutiny); infra
notes 170-74 and accompanying text (discussing Title VII cases).
41. S. REP No. 417, supra note 2, at 19, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 196.
42. See id. at 26-27, reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 203-05 (discussing impact of
Bolden and need to amend § 2). Obviously, the Bolden decision affected numerous voting
rights cases making their way through the courts. Id. In the wake of Bolden, plaintiffs
virtually stopped bringing new vote dilution suits. Id.
43. Id. at 27, reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 205. Plaintiffs may elect to establish
a § 2 violation either with evidence of discriminatory purpose or under the pre-Bolden results
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standard governing voting rights litigation' and provides in part:
[a] violation [of section 2] is established if, based on the totality of the
circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to
participation
m that its members have less opportunity than other
members of the electorate to participate m the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice.'

Amended section 2 employs the "results" test& and the factors articulated
in White v Regester47 and Zimmer v McKeithen." Congress intended that
standard. Id.
44. See Thornburg v Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 43-44 (1986) (discussing Senate Report
No. 417); see also S. REP No. 417, supra note 2, at 15, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N at
192 (noting that § 2 violation is based on totality of circumstances).
45. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1988).
46. S. REP No. 417, supra note 2, at 28, repnnted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 205-07
The typical factors used in applying the results test include: (1) the extent of any history of
official discrimination that affected minority access to the democratic process; (2) the extent
of racially polarized voting; (3) the use of large election districts, majority vote requirements,
anti-single shot provisions, or other voting procedures that enhance the opportunity for
discrimination against minorities; (4) the extent to which minorities have been excluded from
any candidate slating process; (5) the extent to which discrimination in education,
employment, and health has hindered the effective participation of minorities in the political
process; (6) whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial
appeals; (7) the extent to which minorities have been elected to public office; (8) whether
elected officials lack responsiveness to the particularized needs of minority communities; and
(9) whether the policy underlying the challenged practice is tenuous. Id. at 28-29, reprnted
in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 206-07 These factors, while often being the most relevant ones,
are not exclusive and other factors may be relevant in some cases. Id.
47 412 U.S. 755,767 (1973). In White, the Supreme Court considered a constitutional
challenge to the 1970 Texas legislative reapportionment plan. Id. at 756. At the outset, the
Court held that in the interest of judicial economy and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1253 it had
jurisdiction over the appeal in this case. Id. at 759-61. The Court held that the district court
erred in finding that a 9.9% population differential made out a prima facie Equal Protection
violation under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 761-64. However, the Supreme Court
affirmed the district court's decision that required the redrawing of the multimember districts
at issue into single-member districts. Id. at 765-67 Concluding that the district court's
findings represented a blend of history and an intensely local appraisal of the effect of the
multimember districts, the Supreme Court declined to disturb the findings. Id. at 766-70.
48. 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973). In Zimmer, the Fifth Circuit considered whether
an at-large voting scheme can dilute black voting strength when blacks constitute a majority
of the population but a minority of the registered voters. Id. at 1300. First, the court held
that the district court's reliance on population statistics, to the exclusion of all other factors,
accorded such statistics impermissible weight. Id. at 1302-03. Next, the Fifth Circuit distinguished the one man, one vote principle from the vote dilution principle. Id. at 1303. Popu-
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courts not apply the factors of the results test mechanically, but rather apply
the factors m view of the totality of the circumstances.49

Amended section 2 is the major statutory device to combat discrimmation in voting procedures and incorporates the extensive case law that
developed around the results test.' While most recent section 2 litigation
involves challenges to structural practices or vote dilution cases, the earlier
case law applying the results test is particularly important in determining the
proper analytic framework for current section 2 cases challenging episodic
practices. 5 Nevertheless, any evaluation of amended section 2 requires
discussing two important vote dilution cases.
C. CourtApplication of Amended Section 2
Thornburg v Gingles52 was the first Supreme Court case to interpret
amended section 2." The Thornburg Court emphasized that a section 2
lation, according to the court, properly measures equality in apportionment cases, but access
to the political process measures equality in the vote dilution context. Id. Therefore, the
Fifth Circuit held that the district court erred in applying a per se rule that vote dilution
claims could not be found where blacks constitute a population majority.. Id. at 1304. The
court next discussed the typical factors that may contribute to finding a vote dilution violation.
Id. at 1305. Despite evidence showing some success of black candidates and the lack of evidence showing government insensitivity to minority interests, the Fifth Circuit concluded that
the at-large election scheme resulted in vote dilution. Id. at 1305-07 Finally, the court noted
that its preference for single-member districts may yield where the use of such districts
jeopardizes significant nondiscriminatory interests and where multimember districts afford
greater opportunities for minorities than would single-member districts. Id. at 1307-08.
Therefore, the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded to the district court for further
proceedings. Id. at 1308-09.
49
S. REP No. 417, supra note 2, at 29, reprnted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N at 207
50. Id. at 30, reprntedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N at 207
51. See infra notes 196-208 and accompanying text (discussing cases involving § 2
challenges to episodic practices).
52. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
53. Thornburg v Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 34 (1986) (construing for first time amended
§ 2 of Voting Rights Act). In Thornburg, the Court considered a challenge under § 2 of the
Voting Rights Act to the use of multimember districts in North Carolina. Id. at 35. After
plaintiffs brought suit, Congress amended § 2 to make clear that a § 2 violation could be
established with evidence of discriminatory effect alone. Id. Under amended § 2, discrimmatory intent is not required, and the relevant legal standard is the results test. Id. Furthermore, the Court found that the typical factors probative of a § 2 violation outlined by Wite
and Z/mer should guide lower court application of the results test. Id. at 36-37 The Court
then held that the use of multimember districts generally will not violate § 2 unless bloc
voting along racial lines usually will prevent minorities from electing their preferred representative. rd. at 48-61. The Court found that racially polarized voting referred only to a
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claim rests on the convergence of historical and social factors with a
challenged voting structure to deny minorities an equal opportunity to elect
representatives of their choice.m However, the Supreme Court devoted
much of the opinion to defining legally significant bloc voting and developed
a tripartite test to identify such voting.' The Court rejected the argument
that statistical evidence must show that race was the primary factor in voter

choice and held that racially polarized voting refers to voting correlated with
race, not caused by race.56 Thus, section 2 plaintiffs do not have to establish
a causal link between historical and socioeconomic factors and voting practices.'
Chisom v Roemer s held that amended section 2 applied to judicial
elections.5 9 However, the Chisom Court also concluded that section 2 crecorrelation between voter race and the election of certain candidates. Id. at 74. Therefore,
§ 2 plaintiffs need not prove discriminatory intent or causation to establish racial bloc voting.
Id. Additionally, the Court held that a § 2 violation was not foreclosed merely because some
minority candidates had experienced electoral success. Id. at 74-77 The Court established
that an ultimate finding of vote dilution based on the totality of the circumstances is a factual
finding reviewable under the clearly-erroneous test of Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Id. at 78-79. Because the district court appropriately considered the totality of
the circumstances with regard to all but one of the challenged districts, the Supreme Court
affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court judgment. Id. at 80.
54. See Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 36-37; Andrew P Miller & Mark A. Packman, Amended Section 2 ofthe Voting Rights Act: What Is the Intent of the Results Test?, 36 EMORY L.J.
1, 66 (1987) (concluding that Thornburg's emphasis on racial bloc voting may be inconsistent
with congressional intent in amending § 2); see also Nash v Blunt, 797 F Supp. 1488, 1496
(W.D. Mo. 1992) (stating that Thornburg protects right to elect and not right to influence).
55. See Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 50-51 (discussing importance of bloc voting to § 2 vote
dilution claim). The Thornburg Court's test requires three elements for demonstration of
racial bloc voting: (1) the minority is large and compact enough to constitute a majority in
a single-member district, (2) the minority is politically cohesive, and (3) the white majority
votes as a bloc to defeat the minority-preferred candidate. Id., see also Miller & Packman,
supra note 54, at 65 (concluding that Thornburg's emphasis on racial bloc voting may be
inconsistent with congressional intent in amending § 2); Dotti C. Venable, Note, Chisom v
Roemer: One Step Forward,Two Steps Back, 21 STETSON L. REv 985, 1008-09 (1992)
(discussing Thornburg Court's emphasis on racial bloc voting).
56. See Thornburg, 478 U.S. at*63 (holding that results test requires correlation
between voting and race).
57
See id. at 64-65 (holding that § 2 plaintiffs need not establish causal link between
socioeconomic factors and minority voting practices).
58. 501 U.S. 380 (1991).
59. Chisom v Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 398-400 (1991). In Chisom, the Court considered a challenge under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act to Louisiana's system of electing state
supreme court justices from multimember districts. Id. at 385. The Court reviewed the history of the 1982 amendments to § 2 and concluded that Congress chose not to exclude judicial
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ated only one cause of action.'

Justice Scalia wrote a strong dissent, 61 argu-

ing that section 2 created only one right but two causes of action to vindicate
that right.62 Part IV of this Note illustrates that the Chisom holding has

particular significance for plaintiffs challenging episodic practices under
section 2.63 By finding only one cause of action, the Court made claims
based on a loss of influence possible because that loss of influence necessar-

ily interferes with the ability to elect.64
III. CnticalAnalysis of Ortiz
A. Background
In Ortiz v City of PhiladelphiaOffice of the City Commissioners Voter
RegistrationDivision,' the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Cirelections from § 2 protection. Id. at 393-96. The Court held that the language of § 2 does
not create two separate and distinct rights, but rather creates one cause of action to challenge
discriminatory voting practices. Id. at 396-98. The Court concluded that "representatives"
in § 2 referred to winners of representative elections and thus encompassed the election of
judges. Id. at 398-400. Additionally, the Supreme Court earlier had held § 5 applicable to
judicial elections, and the Court concluded that Congress did not intend that the scope of coverage differ between §§ 5 and 2. Id. at 401-02. Finally, the Court rejected defendant's argument that because the Supreme Court earlier rejected constitutional challenges to state judicial
elections, such elections were immune from vote dilution claims. Id. at 402-03. The Court
found this argument unpersuasive because § 2 was enacted to provide broad protection for
voting rights that were not adequately protected by the Constitution. Id. at 403. See Venable, supranote 55, at 1012-14 (discussing Chisom's finding that judges are representatives).
60. See Chisom, 501 U.S. at 396-98 (holding that courts must read language of § 2
conjunctively); see also infra notes 185-92 and accompanying text (criticizing Ortiz court's
application of Chsom).
61. See Chisom, 501 U.S. at 404-17 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that § 2 creates one
right but two causes of action).
62. Id. at 409
If both conditions must be violated before there is any § 2 violation, then
minorities who form such a small part of the electorate in a particular jurisdiction
that they could on no conceivable basis 'elect representatives of their choice'
would be entirely without § 2 protection
[A] protected class that with or
without the practice will be unable to elect its candidate can be denied equal
opportunity to 'participate in the political process' with impunity
Id.
63. See infra notes 193-253 and accompanying text (discussing various models for § 2
cause of action challenging episodic practices).
64. C. Chisom, 501 U.S. at 396-98 (discussing proper reading of § 2 of Voting Rights
Act); Venable, supra note 55, at 1014-18 (concluding that decision in Chisom decreases
likelihood of minority success in vote dilution actions).
65. 28 F.3d 306 (3d Cir. 1994).
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cuit considered a section 2 challenge to Pennsylvania's voter purge statute. 66
This statute allows the registrar to remove from the registration list voters
who fail to vote for two years. 67 The statute establishes procedures for
determining which voters to remove and requires the registrar to give notice
of the impending purge, by mail, to each voter prior to his or her removal
from the registration list. 68 The legislature passed this statute to ensure the
integrity of elections by reducing fraudulent registrations.69
66. Ortizv. City of Phila. Office of the City Comm'rs Voter Registration Div., 28 F.3d
306, 307 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that § 2 requires evidence that challenged practice caused
minorities to be unable to elect their chosen representatives). Counsel for both parties
conceded that this appears to be the only case considering whether a nonvoting purge law
violates § 2 of the Voting Rights Act as amended in 1982. Tucker v City of Phila. Office
of the City Comm'rs Voter Registration Div., No. 91-6681 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 29, 1991)
(memorandum and order denying preliminary injunction); Brief of Appellees at 41-42, Ortiz
(93-1634).

67

25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.

§ 623-40 (1994) (amended 1976).

Id. Section 623-40 provides:
During each year, the commission shall cause all of the district registers to
be examined, and in the case of each registered elector who is not recorded as
having voted at any election or primary during the two calendar years immediately
preceding, the commission shall send to such elector by mail, at his address
appearing upon his registration affidavit, a notice, setting forth that the records of
the commission indicate that he has not voted during the two immediately preceding calendar years, and that his registration will be cancelled if he does not
vote in the next primary or election or unless he shall, within ten days of the next
primary or election, file with the commission, a written request for reinstatement
of his registration, signed by him, setting forth his place of residence. A list of
the persons to whom such notices shall have been mailed shall be sent promptly
to the city chairman of the political party of which the electors were registered as
members. At the expiration of the time specified in the notice, the commission
shall cause the registration of such elector to be cancelled unless he has filed with
the commission a signed request for reinstatement of his registration as above
provided. The official registration application card of an elector who has registered may qualify as a reinstatement of his registration or a removal notice. The
cancellation of the registration of any such elector for failure to vote during the
two munediately preceding calendar years shall not affect the right of any such
elector to subsequently register in the manner provided by this act.
Whenever the registration of an elector has been cancelled through error,
such elector may petition the commission for the reinstatement of his registration
not later than the tenth day preceding any primary or election, and after a hearing
on said application, if error on the part of the commission is proved, the commission shall reinstate the registration of such elector.

68.

Id.
69. See Ortiz v. City of Phila. Office of the City Comm'rs Voter Registration Div., 824
F Supp. 514, 517 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (discussing Pennsylvania legislature's intent in passing
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Each January, a computer search by the voter registration division identifies those voters who have failed to vote m a primary or general election
within the last two years.70 The voter registration division then mails an
"intent to purge notice" to voters identified by this search. 7' The notice
explains that the registrar will purge the voter from the registration list if the
voter does not vote m the next election or submit a written request for
reinstatement.'
Prior to the 1991 election, the registrar slated 193,000
(21%) of Philadelphia's registered voters for removal from the registration
list pursuant to the Pennsylvania statute.73
B. The District Court Opinion
Plaintiffs7 4 brought suit in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania challenging the validity of the Pennsylvama
law under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and the First and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution.7' Plaintiffs contended that
voter purge law).
70. Id. at 518.
71. Id. The "intent to purge notice" reads as follows:
Our Records indicate you have failed to vote for the last two years. As
required by law, we will cancel your Registration, unless you vote in the next
Primary or Election or File with this Commission a written request for Reinstatement (10) days prior to the next Primary or Election, signed by you, giving your
present residence. This is the only notice you will receive
Id.
72. Id.
73. Ortiz v City of Phila. Office of the City Comm'rs Voter Registration Div., 28 F.3d
306, 307 (3d Cir. 1993).
74. Plaintiffs included Philadelphia City Councilman Angel Ortiz, Project VOTE, and
Service Employees International Union Local 36, which represents janitorial employees m
the City of Philadelphia, 60% of whom are members of a minority group. Ortiz, 824 F
Supp. at 516.
75. Id. (holding that PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 623-40 does not violate § 2 of Voting
Rights Act). Most cases challenging voter purge laws have done so on constitutional grounds
or for failure of officials to comply with statutorily mandated procedures. However, voter
purge laws generally have passed constitutional muster. See generally Hoffman v Maryland,
928 F.2d 646 (4th Cir. 1991) (upholding constitutionality of Maryland voter purge law); Brier
v Luger, 351 F Supp. 313 (M.D. Pa. 1972) (finding purge nondiscriminatory despite
evidence that 83% of those purged were Democrats); Williams v Osser, 350 F Supp 646
(E.D. Pa. 1972) (upholding constitutionality of Pennsylvania purge law); Williams v Osser,
326 F Supp. 1139 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (refusing to enjoin purging of voters pursuant to
Pennsylvama statute); Duprey v Anderson, 518 P.2d 807 (Colo. 1974) (upholding Colorado
voter purge law); Barber et al., supra note 14, at 514-17 (reviewing cases holding that
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the voter purge law had a disparate inpact on minority voters, that discrimination in voting was endemic to the political process in Philadelphia, that
minorities faced discrimination in housing and employment, and that city
76
officials had demonstrated a lack of responsiveness to minority concerns.
The City of Philadelphia (the City) acknowledged that the voter purge statute
had a disproportionate impact on minorities, but argued that the plaintiffs
had to prove more to establish a section 2 violation. 7 Additionally, the City
argued that the voter purge law did not cause unequal access to the political
process.78
After reviewing the history of the Voting Rights Act, the district court
considered the application of section 2 to the Pennsylvania voter purge law 71
The court noted that although voters did not often make section 2 challenges
to episodic practices, the legislative history of the Voting Rights Act indicated an intent that section 2 apply to all voting-related discrmination.' The
district court closely examined the Thornburg Court's decision, but declined
to rule that the plaintiffs had to satisfy the Thomburg tripartite test8 in order
to establish a section 2 episodic practices violation.' The parties and the
court agreed that the challenge to the Pennsylvania voter purge statute was
distinguishable from the challenge to the structural practice present m
Thornburg 83 Therefore, the court evaluated the plaintiffs' claim based on

application of purge laws violated state or local statute). But see generally Michigan State
UAW v Austin, 198 N.W.2d 385 (Mich. 1972) (holding that voter purge law violated
Michigan state constitution).

76.

Ortiz v. City of Phila. Office of the City Comm'rs Voter Registration Div., 824 F

Supp. 514, 519 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (holding that Pennsylvania nonvoting purge law did not
violate § 2 of Voting Rights Act).

77

Id.

78. Id.
79. Id. at 521.
80. See id. at 521-22 (holding that Pennsylvania nonvoting purge law did not violate § 2
of Voting Rights Act). The court wrote that:
The scope of the statute therefore includes all electoral practices that deny
minority voters equal opportunity to participate in any phase of the political
process and to elect candidates of their choice, even if the challenged practice is
episodic rather than involving a permanent structural barrier infringing upon the
right to vote.
Id. at 522 (citing S. REP No. 417, supra note 2).
81.
See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text (discussing tripartite Thornburg test
for determining legally significant bloc voting).
82. Ortiz, 824 F Supp. at 523.
83. See rd. (recognizing distinction between episodic practices and vote dilution). The
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the Senate factors' rather than using the Thornburg tripartite test.'
Moreover, the district court noted that it was free to consider other

factors not mentioned m Senate Report 417 that also indicate a section 2
violation. 6 The court then held that plaintiffs additionally must establish
Althat the voter purge law caused the alleged discriminatory result.'
though the plaintiffs acknowledged that Thornburg required a showing
that the challenged structure (mulitmember district, redistricting plan,
etc.) was responsible for the inability of minority voters to elect their
preferred candidates, they argued that only section 2 vote dilution cases
require proof of causation. 8 The district court rejected this argument as
court stated:
I am not persuaded that the analysis outlined i Thornburg governs the voting
Thornburg involved a vote dilution
rights issue presently under consideration
claim challenging the use of multi-member districts, whereas plaintiffs' claim
alleges that the voter purge law precludes otherwise eligible minority voters from
exercising their right to vote and participate in the political process. Naturally,
mthe context of a vote dilution claim, plaintiffs should be required; as a threshold
matter, to demonstrate the Thornburgstandard because those factors directly address the ultimate issue in the case: namely, whether the use of a multi-member
district denies minority voters equal access to the political process and the ability
to elect their representatives of choice.
It simply is not clear that the Thornburg pre-conditions are relevant to the
plaintiffs' challenge that the voter purge law violates § 2. This conclusion does
not reflect the view that Thornburg is only applicable to vote dilution claims: it
merely reflects my view that the Thornburgfactors,while probative in the context
of vote dilution cases, areperipheralissues bearing limited relevance to the plaintiffs' claim presently before the Court.
Id. (emphasis added) (citations ommitted).
84. See supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text (discussing typical factors probative
of vote dilution).
85. See supra note 55 and accompanying text (discussing tripartite Thornburg test for
determining legally significant bloc voting).
86. Ortiz, 824 F Supp. at 524 (citing S. REP No. 417, supra note 2); see also Gomez
v. City of Watsonville, 863 F.2d 1407, 1413 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that Senate factors are
not exhaustive).
Ortiz, 824 F Supp. at 524. "[P]laintiffs must additionally establish that the voter
87
purge law caused minority voters to experience unequal opportunity to participate in the
political process and to elect their preferred representatives." Id. (emphasis added).
88. Id. The court complained that plaintiffs cited no cases supporting the contention
that a plaintiff need not prove causation in a challenge to an episodic practice. Id.
Furthermore, the court concluded that plaintiffs had relied erroneously on Senate Report 417,
which stated that
disproportionate educational, employment, income level, and living conditions
arising from past discrimination tend to depress minority political participation.
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inapposite.89 The court concluded that
implicit m any finding that a challenged electoral procedure violates
section 2 is the conclusion that the electoral procedure is the dispositive
force depriving minorities of equal access to the political process, and that
in the absence of such a procedure, minorities would not be deprived of
equal access to the political process and the ability to elect their candidates
of choice.'
The court went on to find that section 2 required evidence of causation to
establish a violation even when the plaintiffs could show that the purge law
operated with a disparate impact on minority voters'in Philadelphia.91 As the
district court explained the law, a section 2 plamtiff challenging an episodic
practice did not have to meet the three-part causation test of Thornburg, but
did have to prove a causal link between the challenged practice and minonty
access to the political process. 92
At trial, the plaintiffs produced statistical evidence that demonstrated the
disparate impact of the purge law on minority voters.93 The evidence
showed that in 1990, the registrar purged minority voters at a rate approxiWhere these conditions are shown, and where the level of black participation in
politics is depressed, plaintiffs need not prove any further causal nexus between
their disparate socioeconomic status and the depressed level of political participation.
S. REP No. 417, supra note 2, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 207 n.114 (citations
omitted). This language, concluded the court, makes clear that no causal link between socioeconomic factors and political participation rates need be established. Ortiz, 824 F Supp.
at 525. On the other hand, the court found that this language did not address whether causation must be established between the challenged practice and the disenfranchisement of minority voters. Id.
89. Ortiz, 824 F Supp. at 525.
90. Id. at 524 (emphasis added).
91. Id. at 525-26. The court wrote:
Although the Court recognizes that in cases involving discriminatory effect as
opposed to discriminatory intent, there is always an emphasis upon demonstrating
a statistically significant impact, this emphasis is not a substitute for establishing
that based upon the totality of the circumstances, the challenged electoral
procedure is responsible for the minority groups' inability to participate in the
political process and elect their representatives of choice.
Id. at 526.
92. See id. at 525-26 (concluding that statistical disparity in purge rates alone is not
sufficient evidence of causation to establish § 2 violation).
93. Id. at 526. Plaintiffs relied on ecological regression analysis and extreme case
analysis provided by Dr. Allan Lichtman, Professor of History at The American University,
College of Arts and Sciences, in Washington, D.C. Id. at 526-27
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mately 38% higher than white voters.94 Generally, the registrar purged 27%
of Latmos, 25.8 % of African-Americans, and 17.3 % of white registrants.9'
After adjustment for reregistration, the law removed 20.8% of minority
voters from the registration list compared to 13.2% of white voters.96 The
district court accepted the plaintiffs' data and concluded that the purge law
clearly had a disproportionate impact on African-American and Latino
voters. 97
The district court next considered Philadelphia's history of discrimination in registration, voting, and political participation, as well as the effect
of this discrimination on minority participation in the democratic process.9 8
The court made extensive findings of fact regarding the existence of racially
polarized voting in Philadelphia, limited minority access to candidate slating
processes, and the extent to which minorities bear the effects of discrimination in education, housing, health care, employment, and mcome. 99 The
court also considered the number of political campaigns that have contained
racial appeals 0 and the number of minorities elected to office in Philadelphia.'O Finally, the court found that Philadelphia officials had not addressed
some of the particularized needs of minority voters.'°2 However, despite
these findings, the district court denied the plaintiffs' request for injunctive
relief.103 The decision rested primarily on the court's holding that evidence
of disparate unpact is insufficient to make out a section 2 violation unless a
plaintiff can show a causal link between the challenged practice and minority
access to the political process.104
94.

Id. at 527 For a summary of Dr. Lichtman's findings, see Table 2 m the district

court oplion and the accompanying discussion. Id. at 527-28.

95. Id. at 528.
96. Id. Dr. Lichtman studied voter registration data covering 1989-1991. For a more
complete discussion of Dr. Lichtman's findings, see d. at 526-31, which discusses the
disproportionate impact of Pennsylvania's nonvoting purge statute on minority voters m
Philadelphia.
97 Id. at 530. In fact, studies have documented that voter purge laws have a disparate
impact on minority voters. See THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIvIL RIGHTS, THE
VOTING RIGHTS ACT: TEN YEARS AFTER, 83-95 (1975) (discussing impact of purge laws).
98. See Orftz, 824 F Supp. at 531 (discussing Philadelphia's failure to provide adequate
bilingual voting information).
99
Id. at 533-36.
100. Id. at 536-37
101. Id. at 537-38.
102. Id. at 538.
103. Id. at 539.
104. Id.
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C. The Third Circuit Court ofAppeals Opinion
On appeal to the Third Circuit, the plaintiffs abandoned their claims
under the United States Constitution and state law and challenged only the
district court's denial of their section 2 claim. 1 5 The plaintiffs argued that
the district court erred in holding that the plaintiffs failed to prove that the
voter purge law caused the removal of minorities from the registration lists
at higher rates than white voters. 106 At the outset, the court of appeals
established that clear error is the standard of review employed m voting
rights cases."° Next, the court reviewed the history of the Voting Rights
Act and the 1982 amendments to section 2.08 Also, the court examined the
Supreme Court's decision in Thornburg and Senate Report 417 on amended
section 2.'09
Following this background, the Third Circuit framed the issue as whether the district court erred by including causation in the totality of the circumstances analysis." 0 Quoting language from Thornburg,"' the court concluded that section 2 requires some causal connection between a challenged
voting practice and minority access to the political process."' The Turd
Circuit cited cases from three other circuits"' to support its holding that
105. See Ortiz v City of Phila. Office of the City Comm'rs Voter Registration Div., 28
F.3d 306, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that Pennsylvania's voter purge law does not
violate § 2 of Voting Rights Act). Although plaintiffs based their claims on the 1991 election,
their claims were not moot because they were "capable of repetition yet evading review."
Id. (quoting Weinstein v Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975)).
106.

Ortiz, 28 F.3d at 308.

107 See id. at 308-09 (discussing proper standard of review in voting rights cases). The
standard that a district court applies to determine whether a challenged practice has a
discriminatory effect is a question of law subject to plenary review. Id. at 309; accord
Jenkins v Red Clay Consol. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 4 F.3d 1103, 1116-17 (3d Cir. 1993)
(holding that clearly erroneous standard does not give district courts unfettered discretion in
§ 2 cases because underlying legal analysis is subject to plenary review).
108. Ortiz, 28 F.3d at 309; see also supra notes 24-51 and accompanying text (discussing
legislative history of Voting Rights Act and 1982 amendments to § 2).
109
Ortiz, 28 F.3d at 309-10; see also supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text
(discussing Thornburg Court's interpretation of amended § 2).
110. Ortiz, 28 F.3d at 310.
111. 'Iomburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986). "The essence of a § 2 claim is that
a certain electoral law, practice, or structure interacts with social and historical conditions to
cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters to elect their
preferred representatives." Id.
112. Ortiz, 28 F.3d at 310.
113. See id. at 310-11 (discussing § 2 cases from other circuits). The court cited Salas
v Southwest Tex. Junior College Dist., 964 F.2d 1542 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that use
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plaintiffs must demonstrate a causal connection between a challenged voting
practice and a discriminatory result to prevail under section 2.114 In fact,
the court characterized the plaintiffs' contention to the contrary as without
merit." 5
The court of appeals reviewed, but did not disturb, the district court's
findings of fact." 6 The Third Circuit downplayed the lower court's use of
the "dispositive force" language" 7 and found instead that this phrase meant
only a legally dispositive cause." ' The court reiterated the importance of
ensuring the right to vote in a democratic society, but found that m the
instant case, the state was not responsible for depriving minorities of the
right to elect their chosen representatives." 9 Instead, the court concluded
that historical factors caused lower minority turnout.' 2 ° In addition, the
court explained that purge statutes are a legitimate means by which to
prevent voter fraud.' 2' Thus, the court concluded that the City purged
minorities more often than whites only because minorities voted less
22

often. 1

of at-large electoral system did not violate § 2 of Voting Rights Act); Irby v Virginia
State Bd. of Elections, 889 F.2d 1352 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that Virginia's appomtive system for selecting school board members did not violate § 2 of Voting Rights Act),
cert. denied, 496 U.S. 906 (1990); Wesley v Collins, 791 F.2d 1255 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that Tennessee's felon disenfranchisement law did not violate § 2 of Voting Rights Act);
see also infra notes 207-08 and accompanying text (discussing Ortiz court's use of these § 2
cases).
114. Ortiz, 28 F.3d at 310-II.
115.
Id. at 312 (stating that "[plaintiffs'] argument to the contrary is without legal foundation, devoid of endorsement in existing caselaw and the legislative history of § 2 of the
Voting Rights Act, and is not supported by evidence.").
116. Id. at 312-13.
117
See Ortiz v City of Phila. Office of the City Comm'rs Voter Registration Div., 824
F Supp. 514, 524, 539 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (holding that Pennsylvania's nonvoting purge law
did not violate § 2 of Voting Rights Act despite disparate impact on minority voters).
118.
Ortiz, 28 F.3d at 313 n.ll.
119
Id. at 313.
120. Id. at 313 n.12; see supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text (discussing Thornburg).
121.
Ortiz, 28 F.3d at 314 (citing Hoffman v Maryland, 928 F.2d 646, 649 (4th Cir.
1991) (upholding constitutionality of Maryland's nonvoting purge law)); see also Rosario v
Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 761 (1973) (recognizing states' interest in preserving integrity of
electoral process); Barilla v Ervin, 886 F.2d 1514, 1523-24 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting states'
legitimate interest in preventing voter fraud).
122. See Ortiz, 28 F.3d at 313-14 (holding historical and socioeconomic factors irrelevant to plaintiffs' § 2 claim).
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The Third Circuit next discussed the Supreme Court's Chisom decision.
The Ortiz court found that Chisom requires a section 2 plaintiff to
show that minorities had less opportunity to participate in the political
process and to elect their chosen representatives.124 The court held that the
plaintiffs could not satisfy these requirements because there was no
evidence of inability to elect officials."Z Therefore, the court concluded
that the plaintiffs did not prove both elements of a section 2 cause of action
23

because they failed to establish causation.126 The court of appeals focused

next on the fact that all of those purged under the Pennsylvania law
previously had registered to vote.'27 The court reasoned that those purged
had overcome the socioeconomic disadvantages discussed at length by the
plaintiffs and the dissent. 2 ' In light of this conclusion, the court found the

societal disadvantages suffered by minorities in Philadelphia irrelevant to
the plaintiffs' section 2 claim. 129

The Third Circuit rejected the suggestion that the City must prove the
need for the voter purge law 130 However, even if required to consider the
123. Id. at 314.
124. Id. (citing Chisom v Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 397 (1991) (holding that § 2 creates
only one cause of action)); see supra notes 215-21 and accompanying text (discussing Ortiz
court's misapplication of Chisom).
125. See Ortiz, 28 F.3d at 315 (holding that Pennsylvania's nonvoting purge law did not
violate § 2 of Voting Rights Act despite evidence of law's disparate impact on minority
voters).
126. Id. at 315.
127
See id. at 315-16 (holding historical and socioeconomic factors irrelevant because
Pennsylvania's nonvoting purge law operated only on those who previously registered to
vote).
128. Id.
129. See id. at 316 (holding that Pennsylvania's nonvoting purge law did not violate § 2
of Voting Rights Act despite evidence of law's disparate impact on minority voters). The

court stated:
The societal disadvantages cited by the plaintiffs and the dissent just are not
relevant. They are not relevant because they could not have diluted voting by a
[Tihe record
registrant or voter who had already registered and/or voted
reveals no link between the societal conditions and factors recited by the dissent
and the electoral practice (i.e. the purge law) challenged by Ortiz.
Id.
130. See id. (holding that purge laws are legitimate means of preventing voter fraud).
The dissent's argument that the City should establish the need for the purge law is based on
Senate Report 417, which provides: "[Plurging of voters could produce a discriminatory
result if fair procedures were not followed, or if the need for a purge were not shown or if
opportunities for re-registration were unduly limited." S. REP No. 417, supra note 2, at 30
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need for the voter purge, the court believed that the purge statute served an
important and legitimate state interest - prevention of electoral fraud.'3 1

Finally, the court criticized both the plaintiffs' and the dissent's focus on
the societal disadvantages of minority Philadelphians on the ground that
such factors were relevant only to registration procedures.' 32
D The Dissenting Opinion
Judge Lewis dissented, initially stating that despite significant

progress, the discrimination prohibited by the Voting Rights Act continues
to damage the integrity and effectiveness of government.133 The dissent

argued that the district court erred by not finding a violation of section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act. 134

First, the dissent reviewed Philadelphia's

administration of the voter purge statute and plaintiffs' expert testimony
regarding its impact on minority voters. 35 Second, Judge Lewis reviewed
the district court's factual findings.' 36 Third, the dissent chronicled the

history of the Voting Rights Act and several major cases interpreting
section 2 of the Act.137 Against this background, Judge Lewis concluded
n. 119, reprnted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 208 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The
dissent also drew an analogy between episodic practices and Title VII disparate impact law,
which allows plaintiffs in an employment discrimination case to show less discrimiatory
alternatives to refute defendant's business justifications. Ortiz, 28 F.3d at 333-34 (Lewis, J.,
dissenting).
131. Ortiz, 28 F.3d at 316.
132. See id. at 317 (arguing that societal disadvantage is relevant to registration, but not
to reregsration). The Ortiz court stated: "When, if ever, a claimant mounts an attack against
Philadelphia's voter registration provisions, then and only then will it be the time to assess
the legality of such procedures in light of the societal disadvantages highlighted by the
dissent." Id.
133. Id. (Lewis, J., dissenting).
134. See id. at 319 (arguing that majority misapplied § 2 of Voting Rights Act).
135. Id. at 319-20. To put the disparate impact of the nonvoting purge law in
perspective, the dissent quoted the testimony of Dr. Lichtman:
Wf the black [purge] rate in 1991 had been as low as the white rate, about 28,000
fewer black registrants would have been [slated for purging] in 1991. Conversely,
if the white purge rate in 1991 had been as high as the black rate, about 41,000
more white registrants would have been [slated for purging] in 1991.
Id. at 320 n.2.
136. Id. at 320-21, see supra notes -93-102 and accompanying text (discussing district
court's findings of fact).
137
Ortiz, 28 F.3d at 321-22 (Lewis, J.,dissenting); see supra notes 24-42 and
accompanying text (discussing passage of Voting Rights Act and judicial interpretation of
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that courts must take a functional, practical, and realistic approach to
voting rights cases.13 In the dissent's view, the Thornburg Court identified
the essence of a section 2 claim as whether the challenged practice or
structure interacts with social and historical conditions to cause unequal
political opportumties for minonty groups. 39
The dissent accepted as unassailable the proposition that section 2
plaintiffs must show a causal connection between the challenged practice
or structure and discrumnatory results.140 However, the dissent argued that
the majority's approach required that plaintiffs demonstrate more than just
a causal link.' 41 The majority mandated that plaintiffs establish that the
challenged practice was the principal cause of the discriminatory result. 142
Tis requirement, according to Judge Lewis, misinterpreted the legislative
hustory and relevant case law concerning section 2.143 A proper application
of the law, argued the dissent, requires only that the challenged practice be
a contributing cause of the discriminatory result.'" In the dissent's view,
a challenged practice violates section 2 if it interacts
with other external
4
conditions to produce a discrminatory result.' 1
The City did not defend the district court's dispositive force language
at oral argument, but rather suggested that, despite this error, the district court applied the correct standard. 146 The dissent agreed that the
district court understood the correct standard, but was troubled that the
Ortiz majority did not qualify its support for the dispositive force lan§2).
138. Ortiz, 28 F.3d at 322 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
139. Id., see also Thornburg v Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986) (defining § 2 cause of
action following 1982 Amendments to Voting Rights Act).
140. Ortiz, 28 F.3d at 322-23 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 323.
142. Id. The dissent focused on the district court's statement that the § 2 challenge failed
because plaintiff did not show that "the purge law [was] the dispositiveforce in depriving
minority voters of equal access to the political process
" Ortiz v City of Phila. Office
of the City Comm'rs Voter Registration Div., 824 F.Supp. 514, 539 (E.D. Pa. 1993)
(emphasis added). Plaintiffs argued that this language incorrectly stated the standard for § 2
cases. Oftiz, 28 F.3d at 313 n.11. However, the Third Circuit concluded that in the context
of the entire opinion, dispositive force meant a cause that is "legally dispositive." Id. The
court of appeals did not elaborate further on the meaning of a legally dispositive cause and
left future plaintiffs with considerable uncertainty regarding the prima facie § 2 case.
143.
Ortiz, 28 F.3d at 323 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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guage.' 47 This construction of section 2 led to the majority's conclusion,
which was shocking to the dissent, that the social, economic, and historical
disadvantages found by the district court were irrelevant in the absence of

a "legally dispositive" causal link.'48 The dissent stated that the majority's
position, if honestly appraised, required that a challenged practice actually
cause the other circumstances that might contribute to a discriminatory
result.'49 The dissent argued that the challenged practice need only interact

with other circumstances to cause a discriminatory result.'50 On this basis,
the dissent contended that the majority erred in its construction of section
2 and in its conclusion that a searching analysis of the reasons why
minorities vote less often was unnecessary

151

147
Id. at 323 n.7 The dissent explained the majority's reasoning:
[While black and Latino voters have turned out in lower numbers, the purge law
did not cause that statistical disparity And because the plaintiffs have not shown
that the purge law itself has prevented members of minority groups from voting,
they have failed to prove the kind of causation that the majority reads § 2 to
require. Under this construction, a challenged voting law is permissible unless it
is entirely responsible for the abridgment of plaintiffs' political opportunities; if
other factors interact with the challenged law to bring about such a discriminatory
result - absent proof that those factors are themselves products of the law - no
violation of § 2 has occurred.
Id. at 323-24; see supra notes 117-22 and accompanying text (discussing Ortiz court's
requirement that plaintiffs show legally dispositive causal link between voter purge law and
higher rates of minority purging).
148. Ortiz, 28 F.3d at 324 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
149 Id. at 325. Relying on Thornburg v Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986), the dissent
stated that the majority's construction of § 2 is "an unsupported and insupportable distortion
of the Voting Rights Act with which I could not disagree more strongly " Ortiz, 28 F.3d at
325 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
150. Ortiz, 28 F.3d at 325 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 327 The dissent made much of the majority's simple explanation that the law
purged blacks and Latmos at higher rates simply because they vote less often. The majority's
approach does not require any further inquiry into the reasons for the law's effect.
Therefore, the dissent wrote:
So, if the majority is right, Congress and the Supreme Court - by relieving
plaintiffs of the need to prove a causal connection between discrimination and
socioeconomic disadvantage, on the one hand, and lower participation rates, on
the other - have effectively immunized non-voting purge laws from § 2
challenges. Such laws cannot be responsible for the disparate impact they have
when, as a matter of law, discrimination and disadvantage are at least principally
to blame. Clearly, though, Congress and the Supreme Court have done no such
thing
Id. at 326.
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The dissent believed that Mississippi State Chapter, OperationPUSH
v Allain 52 (PUSH 1) closely paralleled Ortiz and applied the correct
construction of section 2 to episodic practices.153 In PUSH I the district

court found that Mississippi's registration procedures interacted with
inequality in the availability of transportation and the occupational status of
blacks to reduce black registration rates. 54 This disparate impact, the
PUSH I court found, resulted in minorities having less opportunity to
participate in the political process and thus constituted a section 2
violation. 55 The Fifth Circuit affirmed PUSH I in Mississippi State
Chapter, Operation PUSH v Mabus'5 6 (PUSH III).

The PUSH courts

examined the interaction of the challenged practice with social, economic,
and historical factors. 5 7 The Ortiz dissent argued that the PUSH courts
152. 674 F Supp. 1245 (N.D. Miss. 1987).
153. Mississippi State Chapter, Operation PUSH v Allain, 674 F Supp. 1245, 1263-68
(N.D. Miss. 1987) [hereinafter PUSH 1] (finding that Mississippi's dual registration system
violated § 2 of Voting Rights Act but that remedial legislation cured violations), aff'd sub
nom. Mississippi State Chapter, Operation PUSH v Mabus, 932 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1991)
[hereinafter PUSH RI]. In PUSHIII, the Fifth Circuit considered a challenge to PUSHI's
finding that Mississippi's dual registration procedures violated § 2 of the Voting Rights Act
and to PUSHifs approval of the Mississippi Legislature's proposed remedy PUSHIII,932
F.2d at 401-02. The court found that no cases specifically defined the remedial powers of
the federal courts in episodic cases, but that vote dilution cases provided appropriate
guidance. Id. at 406. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit found that district courts must accept a
legislative plan if it does not violate the Voting Rights Act or the Constitution. Id. at 407
Although the remedy might have been broader, the court concluded that the district court did
not abuse its discretion in approving the legislative remedy Id. Nevertheless, the court went
on to find that the legislative plan was not racially motivated and did not show discriminatory
intent merely because the Mississippi legislature rejected two more expansive proposals. Id.
at 408-09. With regard to the original § 2 violation, the court recounted Mississippi's long
history of efforts to reduce the political participation of minorities. Id. at 402. The court
found that blacks had less access to transportation and were employed in jobs that would not
allow them to leave during the workday Id. at 403. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district
court's application of the Senate factors in evaluating plaintiffs' § 2 claim. Id. at 405.
Additionally, the Fifth Circuit held that Thornburg did not require a county-by-county
analysis of voting patterns to determine a violation of § 2. Id. at 409-10. Finally, the court
of appeals concluded that the district court's finding of a 25 % disparity between black and
white registration rates was not clearly erroneous. Id. at 410-12. Thus, the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the district court with regard to both its acceptance of the legislative remedy and its
original finding that Mississippi's dual registration procedures violated § 2. Id. at 412-13.
154. PUSH1, 674 F Supp. at 1268.
155.
Id.
156. 932 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1991) (finding that Mississippi's dual registration system
violated § 2 of Voting Rights Act but that remedial legislation cured violations).
157
Id. at 403.
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correctly understood that whether the challenged practice caused the social,
economic, and historical factors at play in Mississippi was irrelevant to a
In fact, those conditions obviously were not a
section 2 challenge.'
product of the challenged law Nonetheless, the PUSH courts did not
require any showing that the registration procedures at issue m that case
alone caused the lower registration rates of blacks. 59
The dissent also relied on the reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit in
United States v Marengo County Commission"60 to illustrate the majority's
misapplication of section 2.61 Not unlike the Ortiz majority, the district
court in Marengo concluded that lower black registration rates were
attributable to "apathy," rather than to the practice that the plaintiffs
challenged.' 62 However, the Eleventh Circuit rejected this reasoning and

found that section 2 did not require the plaintiffs to prove that the
challenged practice singularly caused the lower registration rate of
blacks.' 63 The Ortiz dissent endorsed this reasoning and cited other cases
that contradict the Ortiz majonty's construction of section 2. "
158. Ortiz v City of Phila. Office of the City Comm'rs Voter Registration Div., 28 F.3d
306, 328 (3d Cir. 1994) (Lewis, J., dissenting).
Id. at 328 n.13.
159
160. 731 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir. 1984).
161.
See United States v Marengo County Comm'n, 731 F.2d 1546, 1563-74 (11th Cir.
1984) (holding that county's at-large election system violated § 2). In Marengo, the Eleventh
Circuit considered a § 2 challenge to Marengo County's at-large system for electing county
commissioners and school board members. Id. at 1552. First, the court held that even
though the litigation began in 1979, § 2 as amended in 1982 should apply to the case. Id. at
1553-55. Second, the Eleventh Circuit found that amended § 2 was based on the enforcement
clauses of both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Id. at 1555. Therefore, the court
rejected defendants' assertion that a vote dilution claim is not cognizable under amended § 2.
Id. at 1555-56. Third, the Eleventh Circuit held that § 2's results test was an appropriate use
of Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Id. at 1556-63.
The court declined to find a § 2 results violation and elected to remand because the district
court directed its inquiry only to whether the plaintiffs demonstrated discriminatory intent.
Id. at 1563. To clarify the proper legal standards applicable to the case, the court explained
in detail how to apply the results test of § 2. Id. at 1563-74. Finally, the Eleventh Circuit
concluded that Marengo County's at-large election system had a discriminatory result at the
time the case was tried, but remanded the case to give both parties an opportunity to update
the record. Id. at 1574-75.
162. Id. at 1568.
163. Otiz, 28 F.3d at 328 (Lewis, J., dissenting) (citing Marengo, 731 F.2d at 1568-75).
164. Ortiz, 28 F.3d at 329 n.14 (Lewis, J., dissenting). For further discussion of those
cases contradicting the Ortiz majority's construction of § 2, see infra notes 193-253 and
accompanying text (discussing alternative models for § 2 causes of action challenging episodic
practices).
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The dissent distinguished a case relied on by the majority, Salas v
Southwest Texas Junior CollegeDistrict."s The Ortiz majority, contended
the dissent, took out of context the Fifth Circuit's statement that plaintiffs

were not entitled to section 2 relief merely because their class turned out
to vote m lower numbers. 6 The Ortiz majority failed to appreciate that the
Hispanic plaintiffs in Salas constituted a majority of the electorate in that
district.167 Therefore, the Salas court found that the plaintiffs in that case
failed to satisfy the Thornburg three-part threshold test for vote dilution
claims 6 because no evidence showed that white bloc voting prevented

Hispamcs from being elected.'69 In the Ortiz dissent's view, the statement
of the Salas court was thus understandable.
Next, the dissent suggested that Title VII disparate impact law
provided an appropriate model for deciding section 2 challenges to episodic
165.
964 F.2d 1542 (5th Cir. 1992).
166. Ortiz, 28 F.3d at 329 (Lewis, J., dissenting) (citing Salas, 964 F.2d at 1556). In
Salas, the Fifth Circuit considered Hispanic voters' challenge under § 2 of the Voting Rights
Act to an at-large districting scheme. Salas, 964 F.2d at 1543. The district court found that
Hispanics comprised a majority of registered voters in the district. Id. at 1544. However,
finding that plaintiffs did not establish legally significant bloc voting, the district court denied
plaintiffs' § 2 claim. Id. at 1545. The Fifth Circuit recounted many of the district court's
findings of fact before discussing the issues on appeal. Id. at 1544-46. First, the Fifth
Circuit held that plaintiffs were not precluded from bringing a vote dilution challenge merely
because they were members of a class that constituted a majority of registered voters. Id. at
1547 The court found that the totality of the circumstances analysis should apply in any vote
dilution case and reviewed the development of these objective criteria, as well as general
voting rights principles. Id. at 1547-51. The court discussed the Thornburg threshold test
for determining legally significant bloc voting, but concluded that it did not displace the
totality of the circumstances analysis. Id. at 1552-54. Underlying both the Thornburg tests
and the totality of the circumstances analysis, the court concluded, is an inquiry into
causation - whether the given practice is responsible for the discriminatory result. Id. at
1554. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court's findings of fact satisfied the totality of
the circumstances analysis. Id. at 1555. Because these findings of facts were not clearly
erroneous, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court denying plaintiffs' § 2
vote dilution claim. Id. at 1556.
167
See Ortiz, 28"F.3d at 329 (Lewis, J., dissenting) (discussing Salas, 964 F.2d at
1555).
168. See supranotes 54-57 and accompanying text (discussing Thornburgpreconditions
to vote dilution challenge).
169. See Ortiz, 28 F.3d at 329 (Lewis, J., dissenting) (discussing Salas, 964 F.2d at
1555). Interestingly, the Salas court went on to find that even though the Hispanic plaintiffs
represented a class constituting a majority of the electoral district in question, a showing that
minority bloc voting, in this case white bloc voting, prevented Hispanics from electing their
chosen representatives might still be possible if other factors interacted with the white bloc
voting to frustrate Hispanic electoral success. Salas, 964 F.2d at 1555-56.
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practices like that at issue in Ortiz.170 Both Title VII and section 2 employ
results tests to determine violations of the rights of protected classes. 17 1 In
Title VII cases, if a plaintiff shows a disparate impact on minorities, the
burden slufts to the employer to show that business necessitates the
practice.
In section 2 cases, however, a plaintiff must establish the
discriminatory result of a challenged law or practice and often will attempt
to establish that the practice is unnecessary 171 In short, a local or state
government defendant in a section 2 case bears no burden of proof, while
a Title VII employer defendant must prove the business necessity of the
challenged practice. 74 The dissent argued that section 2 cases should
follow the Title VII model that requires defendants to establish the necessity
of the challenged practice once plaintiffs show a disparate impact on
minorities. 75 Because neither the majority nor the district court considered
the plaintiffs' evidence of less discriminatory alternatives, the dissent would

have remanded the case.176 In the dissent's view, to determine the necessity
of the Philadelphia practice, the district court should have addressed the
question of whether effective less discrimnatory alternatives existed. 177
170. See Ortiz, 28 F.3d at 333 (Lewis, J., dissenting) (citing cases articulating important
principles of Title VII disparate impact law), The dissent principally relied on Griggs v
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), a Title VII case, which in turn relied on Gaston
County v United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969), a Voting Rights Act case, to explain Title VII
protection of discrimination in disparate impact suits. Ortiz, 28 F.3d at 333 (Lewis, J.,
dissenting); see infra notes 226-37 and accompanying text (discussing Title VII model for
prima facie § 2 case).
171.
Ortiz, 28 F.3d at 334 (Lewis, J., dissenting); see supra notes 43-51 and accompanying text (discussing § 2 results test); see generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(K)(1)(A)(i)
(Supp. V 1993) (articulating Title VII results test).
172. See Ortiz, 28 F.3d at 333-34 (Lewis, J., dissenting) (citing Gnggs, 401 U.S. at 43132 (articulating concept of business necessity)); see also Dothard v Rawlinson, 433 U.S.
321, 329-32 (1977) (finding for plaintiffs after defendant failed to establish business
necessity); f. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) & (C) (1988) (codifying Gnggs business
necessity standard).
173.
Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 22-25, Ortiz (No. 93-1634). For example,
the Ortiz plaintiffs attempted to establish that less discriminatory alternatives were available
to achieve the City's legitimate objective of preventing voter fraud. Id. The availability of
less discriminatory alternatives, in plaintiffs' view, showed that the City's method of purging
voters caused the disproportionate impact on minority voters. Id.
174. See generally Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-1973bb (1988)).
175.
Ortiz, 28 F.3d at 334 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
176. Id.
177
Id. at 335.
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The Ortiz dissent next addressed the burden of reregistration on purged
minority voters and suggested that the majority erred in its consideration of the issue by taking a formalistic rather than a functional view of
political participation.' 78 Judge Lewis argued that the opportunity to
reregister should not alter the basic section 2 analysis simply because
reregistration is within the control of minority voters. 179 The dissent
compared reregistration to "race-neutral literacy tests."' 180 Although the
Ortiz majority conceded that race-neutral literacy tests were discriminatory, they argued that reregistration was different from such tests. 8 '
However, the Ortiz dissent contended that reregistration necessarily requires literacy and other skills. 82 The dissent concluded that courts must
employ a functional approach when examining the practice of voting."' In
that light, 84registration and reregistration both present substantial obstacles
to voting.
Finally, the dissent discussed the majority's application of the Supreme
8 and concluded that the majority misread the
Court's holding in ChIsom8'
8
6
According to the dissent, the Ortiz majority concluded
Court's decision.
that the plaintiffs failed to show that minorities had experienced difficulty
electing their representatives of choice, and thus failed to satisfy both
elements of a section 2 cause of action.8 7 However, the Ortiz dissent
pointed out that the section 2 language to which the Chisom Court referred
must be read conjunctively rather than disjunctively.8 8 In fact, Justice
178. Id. at 336-40.
179. Id. at 337
180. Id.
181. Ortiz, 28 F.3d at 313.
182. Ortiz, 28 F.3d at 337 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 340. The dissent wrote that: "As a general matter, doing something twice is
registering twice is harder, and will
more difficult than doing something once, [and]
occur less frequently, than registering once." Id. at 338 n.31. Additionally, the dissent
refered to the legislative history of the National Voter Registration Act (the Motor Voter
Act), Pub. L. No. 103-31, 107 Stat. 77 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973gg to 1973gg10, (Supp. V 1993)), to support the dissent's view that reregistration operates as an obstacle
to political participation. Ortiz, 28 F.3d at 339 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
185. See supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text (discussing Chisom).
dissenting).
186. Ortiz, 28 F.3d at 345-46 (Lewis, J.,
Id. at 344; see infra notes 218-21 and accompanying text (discussing importance of
187
Ortiz court's misapplication of Chisom).
188. Ortiz, 28 F.3d at 345 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
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Scalia raised precisely this issue in his dissent in Chisom." 9 Believing that
the right to participate was distinct from the right to elect, Justice Scalia
favored a disjunctive reading of the language of section 2.190 However, the
Supreme Court majority, reasoning that abridgement of the right to participate inevitably impairs the ability to elect, rejected Justice Scalia's interpretation and adopted the conjunctive reading.' 9' Therefore, the opportunity to participate and the opportunity to elect are inextricably linked."

The dissent was correct; the Ortiz majority did misconstrue Chisom.
IV Alternative Models for Section 2 Plaintiff's PrimaFacie Case

A. The Negative Converse-ChisomModel
The Ortiz majority, before considering the impact of any historical or
social factors on voting patterns in Philadelphia, required plaintiffs to satisfy two prima facie elements: (1) less opportunity to participate in the
political process, and (2) less opportunity to elect representatives of their
choice.' 93 The plaintiffs' evidence that the City purged blacks and Hispanics more often than whites was not enough, in the majority's view, to
establish a causal link between the nonvoting purge law and "both elements
189 See Chisom, 501 U.S. at 407-10 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (discussing conjunctive, as
opposed to disjunctive, reading of § 2).
190. See id. at 409 (criticizing majority's construction of § 2).
191. Ortiz, 28 F.3d at 345 n.38 (Lewis, J.,
dissenting) (citing Chisom). Answering the
concerns raised in Justice Scalia's dissent, Justice Stevens wrote for the Chisom Court that:
Any abridgment of the opportunity of members of a protected class to
participate in the political process inevitably impairs their ability to influence the
outcome of an election. As the statute is written, however, the inability to elect
representatives of their choice is not sufficient to establish a violation unless,
under the totality of the circumstances, it can also be said that the members of the
protected class have less opportunity to participate in the political process. The
statute does not create two separate and distinct rights. Subsection (a) covers
every application of a qualification, standard, practice, or procedure that results
in a denial or abridgment of "the right" to vote. The singular form is also used
in subsection (b) when referring to an injury to members of the protected class
who have less "opportunity" than others "to participate in the political process and
to elect representatives of their choice." It would distort the plain meaning of the
sentence to substitute the word "or" for the word "and." Such radical surgery
would be required to separate the opportunity to participate from the opportunity
to elect.
Chisom, 501 U.S. at 397 (citations omitted).
192. See Orttz, 28 F.3d at 344-46 (Lewis, J., dissenting) (discussing Chisom).
193. Ortiz, 28 F.3d at 314-15.
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of a section 2 cause of action." 94 Therefore, the Ortiz court found histoncal and social factors irrelevant to the plaintiffs' case. 195 The majority's

construction of a section 2 cause of action consists of the following elements:
1. Is the challenged practice a legally dispositive cause of the reduced

minority opportunity(a) to participate in the political process, and
(b) to elect their chosen representatives?
2. If so, does this legally dispositive cause (the challenged practice)
interact with historical and socioeconomic indicators of discrimination to reduce minority opportunity*
(a) to participate in the political process, and
(b) to elect their chosen representatives?
There are a number of problems with this approach. First, this
model is unlike the approach that other federal courts have taken in section 2 cases involving episodic practices.' 9 6 For example, in Brown v
Dean"9' 7 the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island
required very little evidence of causation. 9 ' The plaintiffs in Dean pro194. Id. at 315.
195. Id. The majority explained why socioeconomic factors were irrelevant to its § 2
analysis:
Mhe individuals to whom the purge law applies apparently have surmounted and
overcome the societal disadvantages which [plaintiffs] emphasize, and have
registered to vote at least once if not more often
Conversely, if individuals
have never registered and have never voted, the purge law still could not be
applied to them because, as stated, the purge law affects only those who have once
registered to vote
The societal disadvantages cited by the plaintiffs and the dissent just are not
relevant
They are not relevant because they could not have diluted voting
by a registrant or voter who had already registered and/or voted.
Id. at 315-16 (citations omitted).
196. Cf.Mississippi State Chapter, Operation PUSH v Mabus, 932 F.2d 400, 405 (5th
Cir. 1991) (upholding district court's conclusion that application of Senate factors indicated
that Mississippi's registration procedures resulted in lower registration rate of blacks); Harris
v Siegelman, 695 F Supp. 517, 528 (M.D. Ala. 1988) (requiring that plaintiffs show that
lower minority voting level is "in some measure attributable" to challenged practice); Brown
v Dean, 555 F Supp. 502, 504-05 (D.R.I. 1982) (finding that city's location of polling
places interacted with lower rates of minority automobile ownership and lack of public
transportation to deter minority voting in violation of § 2).
197 555 F Supp. 502 (D.R.I. 1982).
198. See Brown v. Dean, 555 F Supp. 502, 504 (D.R.I. 1982) (finding that location of
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duced testimony at trial regarding the lack of public transportation and the

low rate of minority ownership of automobiles.' 99 This evidence, combined
with the lower registration rate of minorities in Rhode Island, was sufficient
for the court to conclude that the location of the polling places had an

impact on minority voting.2"
Hams v Siegelman2 ° ' involved a section 2 challenge to the mistreat-

ment of minority voters at Alabama polling places. 202 The plaintiffs in Harris asserted that this treatment resulted in lower minority registration and
polling places interacted with socioeconomic factors to cause burden on minority voting in
violation of § 2). In Dean, the court considered a challenge brought by representatives of a
class of black voters under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the location of a polling place. Id. at 503. The court
found that many members of the plaintiff class were elderly and lacked access to automobiles.
Id. at 504. The court thus concluded that the location of the polling place was a substantial
deterrent to voting by members of the plaintiff class. Id. The court noted the Supreme
Court's finding Ihat location of polling places directly affects a person's ability to vote and
comes within the ambit of § 2 protection. Id. at 505 (discussing Perkins v Matthews, 400
U.S. 379 (1971)). The court found that the plaintiff sustained her burden of establishing a
likelihood of success on the merits and therefore granted a preliminary injunction against use
of the challenged polling place. Id. at 505-06.
199
See id. at 504 (finding that minorities in Rhode Island had less access to automobiles
than did whites).
200. See id. at 506 (holding that location of polling places was constitutionally deficient).
201.
695 F Supp. 517 (M.D. Ala. 1988).
202. See Harris v Siegelman, 695 F Supp. 517, 527-29 (M.D. Ala. 1988) (holding that
mistreatment of minorities at Alabama polling places violated § 2). In Hams, plaintiffs
representing all black citizens in Alabama brought a challenge under § 2 of the Voting Rights
Act to the mistreatment of black voters at polling places throughout the state and to the
method of appointing poll officials. Id. at 520. The court earlier issued a preliminary
injunction requiring most Alabama counties to appoint more black poll officials. Id. at 521.
Despite a court-approved settlement with regard to most of the defendants, the plaintiffs
continued to pursue § 2 claims against the Governor and the Attorney General. Id. The court
recounted Alabama's history of efforts to reduce the political participation of minorities. Id.
at 522-26. Finding that plaintiffs established that racial discrimination was a motivating
factor behind Alabama's policy and that the practice continued to have adverse effects, the
court concluded that plaintiffs established a § 2 "intent" claim. Id. at 526. The court found
that the results claim presented in this case was different from the vote dilution claim in
Thornburg, but concluded that the Thornburg approach was helpful. Id. at 528. Because the
evidence established that black citizens were reluctant to register and vote due to the
discriminatory Alabama policies, the court found that plaintiffs also established a "results"
claim. Id. at 528-29. Thus, the court declared that the mistreatment of voters at polling
places and the method of selecting poll officials violated § 2. Id. at 526-27 Therefore, the
court enjoined the state from further enforcement of the policies and ordered the state to
submit proposals designed to eliminate the present effects of this discriminatory conduct. Id.
at 529-30.
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voting. 3 The court required that the discriminatory result alleged be in
some measure attributable to the challenged practice. 4 Concluding that
mistreatment at polling places contributedto the reluctance of minorities to
register and vote, the Hams court found a section 2.violation without any
additional evidence of causation. 05
The Ortiz majority borrows too heavily from section 2 cases involving
vote dilution claims, especially Thornburg and Chisom, for its reasoning
and authority

The court does this notwithstanding the district court's

express finding that the Ortiz facts were distinguishable from cases involving vote dilution.0 6 In addition, the majority relies on only two episodic practice cases in reaching its result. 0 7 While the Ortiz court made
mention of the results in those episodic cases, it did not apply the same

analytical framework. 0 8
Additionally, the court mischaractenzed the plaintiffs' claim and argument. The court wrote that the plaintiffs took the untenable position that
causation was not an element in a section 2 cause of action.20 9 The plain203.

Id. at 527-29.

204. Id. at 529.
205. Id. at 528-29.
206. See Ortiz v. City of Phila. Office of the City Comm'rs Voter Registration Div., 824
F Supp. 514, 523 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (recognizing distinction between vote dilution and
episodic practices); see supra notes 79-85 and accompanying text (reviewing district court's
discussion of episodic practice/vote dilution dichotomy).
207
See Ortiz v City of Phila. Office of the City Comm'rs Voter Registration Div., 28
F.3d 306, 310-11 (3d. Cir. 1994) (discussing other § 2 cases). The Ortiz court cited Irby v
Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 889 F.2d 1352 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 906
(1990), and Wesley v Collins, 791 F.2d 1255 (6th Cir. 1986).
208. Ortiz, 28 F.3d at 310-11. The Wesley court wrote that "[i]t is well-settled, however, that a showing of disproportionate racial impact alone does not establish a per se violadon of the Voting Rights Act." Wesley, 791 F.2d at 1260-61. However, the court went on to
write that evidence showing a disproportionate racial impact "directs the court's inquiry into
the interactionof the challenged legislation 'with those historical, social and political factors
generally probative of dilution.'" Id. at 1261 (emphasis added). In Irby, the court believed
that the facts implicated § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, rather than § 2. Irby, 889 F.2d at
1357 The court reluctantly addressed the relevance of § 2 and wrote that
The situation is
we will refrain from holding Section 2 inapplicable here
one calling for us to eschew dictum although, seen in the light of the instant case,
it appears more probable than not that Section 2 is not applicable to appointive
offices. Congress clearly believed that the choice between an elective and an
appointive scheme implicated Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.
Id.
209. Ortiz, 28 F.3d at 312.
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tiffs' briefs do not indicate that the plaintiffs made any such argument. 210
Furthermore, the majority contradicted its own assertion that the plaintiffs
claimed that no causal connection v6as necessary in a section 2 episodic
practices case. The majority wrote that it read the entire complaint to
allege that the purge statute caused the disparate purge rates.2 ' Thus, the

majority believed that the plaintiffs alleged that the purge law caused the
disparate impact and wrote their entire complaint to support this view, but
the majority also believed that the plaintiffs inconsistently argued that no
causal link need be established. In fact, the plaintiffs did claim that they
need not establish any causal nexus between histoncal and socialfactors
and voting practicesin Philadelphia.2"2 Thornburg expressly supports this
interpretation of section 2 and clearly establishes that plaintiffs do not have
to prove a causal link between the Senate factors and voting practices.2"'
Thornburg requires courts to presume that the causal link exists.2" 4 Thus,

the Ortiz majority, rather than the plaintiffs, misunderstood the relationship
between historical factors, socioeconomic evidence, causation, and the

resulting effect on voting practices.
The Ortiz majority's construction of Chisom is also troubling. Their
treatment of Chisom is curious given that the Supreme Court, in response
to concerns raised by Justice Scalia's dissent, expressly held that section 2
210. See Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 4-5, Ortiz (No. 93-1634) (arguing that
district court erred in its construction of § 2). Plaintiffs did not suggest that a § 2 plaintiff
does not have to establish a causal connection between a challenged practice and a
discrmmatory result. Id. Plaintiffs wrote:
[We] do not argue that statistical disparity in the impact of the non-voting purge
on the franchise alone is sufficient to establish liability Rather [we] argue that
where there are reasonable, less discriminatory alternatives to a non-voting purge
that non-voting purge, as here, violates section 2
[L]ess discriminatory
alternatives not only provide the measure for determining the denial of equal
political opportunity resulting from Philadelphia's non-voting purge, they also
demonstrate that this non-voting purge causes, in conjunction with the circumstances in Philadelphia, a denial to Latmo and African-American voters of an
equal opportunity to participate in the electoral process and elect representative of
their choice.
Id.
211.
Ortiz, 28 F.3d at 314. The majority wrote that "[a]s we read Ortiz's complaint, the
entire document is drawn to allege that Pennsylvania's purge statute 'caused' the disparate
purge rates between Philadelphia's white and minority communities." Id.
212. Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 16-17, Ortiz (No. 93-1634).
213. SeeThomburg v Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 64 (1986) (holding that legally significant
bloc voting refers to correlation between race and voting).
214. Id.
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creates only one cause of action and must be read conjunctively 215 Nevertheless, the Ortiz majority's misunderstanding of the Chisom rule - that
burdening of political participation necessarily impairs the ability to elect
and thus violates section 2 - caused it to apply the negative converse of the
Chisom rule - that without impairing the ability to elect, a challenged
practice cannot violate section 2.216 This "no harm, no foul" approach is
wholly inconsistent with the objectives of the Voting Rights Act.217
The Ortiz majority's construction of Chisom is significant because a
section 2 plaintiff might well establish that an electoral practice burdened
the right of minorities to participate in the electoral process, yet not show
that the challenged practice prevented the election of minority candidates. 1 8
215. See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 397 (1991) (holding that right to participate
and right to elect are inextricably linked).
216. A challenged structure or practice violates § 2 if minorities have (A) less opportunity to participate in the political process and (B) less opportunity to elect their chosen
representatives. S. REP No. 417, supra note 2, at 30, repnnted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
207
ahisom held that this language be read conjunctively. Chisom, 501 U.S. at 397 However, the Court went on to hold that if A is established, then B necessarily is established. Id.
Thus, the Chsom rule is "if A, then B." The converse of this rule would be "if B, then A."
Relying on evidence of the political success of black candidates in Philadelphia, the Ortiz
court concluded that plaintiffs had not shown less opportunity to elect their chosen representatives and had thus failed to establish both elements (A and B above) of a § 2 claim.
Ortiz, 28 F.3d at 314-15. The Ortiz rule is "if not B, then not A" Therefore, I refer to the
majority's construction of § 2 as the "negative converse" of Chtsom.
217
Cf Chtsom, 501 U.S. at 407-10 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing implications of
conjunctive reading of § 2). Justice Scalia wrote regarding the relationship between the right
to participate and the right to elect that "[i]f both conditions must be violated before there is
any § 2 violation, then minorities who form such a small part of the electorate in a particular
jurisdiction that they could on no conceivable basis 'elect representatives of their choice'
would be entirely without § 2 protection." Id. at 409. Justice Scalia pointed out that the
Chtsom Court's construction of § 2 might make lawful discriminatory conduct that reduced
the influence of minorities without preventing the election of minority candidates (a "no
harm, no foul" approach). The Chisom Court responded that Justice Scalia's concerns "rest
on the erroneous assumption that a small group of voters can never influence the outcome of
an election." Chtsom, 501 U.S. at 397 n.24. This discussion makes clear that both the
majority and the dissent in Chisom did not contemplate a no harm, no foul approach to § 2
of the Voting Rights Act. Fearing such an approach from the majority's conjunctive reading
of § 2, Justice Scalia dissented. Believing that a conjunctive reading of § 2 did not prevent
minorities from challenging merely the loss of influence as opposed to the inability to elect,
the Chisom Court dismissed Justice Scalia's concerns. Thus, the entire Chisom Court agreed
that practices that reduce minority influence may violate § 2 without actually preventing the
election of minority candidates.
218. See Ortiz, 28 F.3d at 345 n.38 (Lewis, J., dissenting) (discussing importance of
proper application of Chisom). It seems clear that a case establishing a burden on the right
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In such a situation, the Ortiz majority's reading of Chisom would require that
the court dismiss the case because the plaintiff would not have established
"both elements of a section 2 claim." 219 On the other hand, under a proper
application of Chsom, plaintiffs have established a section 2 cause of action
because the right to participate is inseparable from the right to elect.'

Thus, the significance of a conjunctive, rather than a disjunctive, reading of
Chisom is critical to voting rights plaintiffs."

Finally, by disregarding historical and socioeconomc factors and finding that lower minority turnout alone explains the disproportionate impact
of the purge law, the Ortiz court, simply blames the victims of
discrimination for its results. In so holding, the majority ignores the text of
section 2 ,' the instructions of Senate Report 417, ' the guidance of section
2 cases,' and the lingering effect of past racial discrimnation.'
to participate without establishing difficulty electing minority candidates would violate § 2
under a proper reading of Chsom. "[N]ot one member of the [Chisom] Court was willing
to adopt a construction of § 2 under which a measure that operated to abridge a group's
opportunity to participate, but that did not itself prevent that group from electing representatives, would be permissible." Id.
See Ortiz, 28 F.3d at 315. The Ortiz majority simply misapplied Chson. How219
ever, a proper application of Chisom might not change the result in this case. In fact, it
appears that the majority would reach the same result under a proper reading of Chisom
because they reasoned that the nonvoting purge law did not cause a burden on political
participation of minorities. Under the majority's reasoning, the law purged minorities more
often simply because they voted less often. Id. at 313-14. Therefore, plaintiffs did not satisfy
what the majority referred to as the two elements of a § 2 cause of action because the
nonvoting purge law had no legally significant effect on minority voting. Id. The purge law
did not cause minorities to participate less. Rather, the fact that minorities participated less
caused the purge statute to operate against them. Id. Such a result appears inconsistent with
the legislative history of § 2 and the limited case law on episodic practices.
220. See id. at 344-46 (Lewis, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority's application of Chtsom).
221. Contra Venable, supra note 55, at 1018 (concluding that decision in Chisom decreases likelihood of minority success under § 2).
222. 42 U.S.C. ,§1973 (1988). "A violation [of § 2] is established if, based on the
" Id. (emphasis added).
totality of the circumstances, it is shown
223. S. REP No. 417, supra note 2, at 27, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N at 205.
"Plaintiffs must either prove [discriminatory] intent, or, alternatively, must show that the
challenged system or practice, in the context of all the circumstances in the jurisdiction in
question, results in minorities being denied equal access to the political process." Id.
(emphasis added) (citations omitted).
224. See Thornburg v Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 43 (1986) (discussing 1982 Amendments
to § 2 of Voting Rights Act). "[Section] 2 has been violated where the 'totality of the
circumstances' reveal
" Id. (emphasis added). "[A] court must assess the impact of the
contested structure or practice on minority electoral opportunities 'on the basis of objective
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B. The Title WI DisparateImpact Model
The Ortiz dissent advocated that Title VII disparate impact cases serve
as the model for voting rights cases.' The dissent argued that the Supreme
Court's reliance on a voting rights case m Gnggs v Duke Power Co., 7
a Title VII case,' supports this analogy I This disparate impact model
would require defendants to show a compelling reason for a challenged
factors.' Senate Report 417 specifies factors which typically may be relevant to a § 2 clain."
Id. at 44 (emphasis added).
225. See Harris v Siegelman, 695 F Supp. 517, 526 (M.D. Ala. 1988) (holding that
mistreatment of voters at polling places violated § 2 of Voting Rights Act). Regarding the
continuing effects of past discrimination, the court wrote:
Because, for most of this century and the last, black citizens were prohibited by
the state from participating in the political process, many of them lost interest in
the political process and were not concerned with the nuts and bolts of the process.
This state-fostered attitude was then passed on through the family structure, from
generation to generation, with the result that many black children even today lack
interest m politics.
Id.
226. Ortiz, 28 F.3d at 333-34 (Lewis, J., dissenting); see supra notes 170-77 and
accompanying text (discussing dissent's position that courts model § 2 cases after Title VII
disparate impact cases).
227 401 U.S. 428 (1971).
228. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971) (finding that even in
absence of discriminatory intent, employer must establish business necessity of challenged
practice). In Gnggs, the Supreme Court considered whether an employer is prohibited by
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) from requiring a high school education
or passage of a standardized intelligence test as a prerequisite to employment. Id. at 425-26.
The Court found that neither standard significantly related to job performance, that both
requirements had a disproportionate impact on blacks, and that white employees previously
filled the jobs in question. Id. The Court found that the plain language of Title VII indicated
congressional intent to remove barriers that formerly favored white employees and to achieve
equality in employment opportunities. Id. at 429-30. However, Title VII does not guarantee
a job to any person regardless of their qualifications. Id. at 430. Nonetheless, the evidence
in Gnggs showed that current employees who did not meet the new requirements continued
to perform satisfactorily and, in fact, gamed promotions. Id. at 431-32. In view of this
evidence and the fact that the defendant adopted the new standards without any study of their
relationship to job performance, the Supreme Court found that the defendant failed to
establish the business necessity of the requirements. Id. The defendant argued that § 703(h)
of the Civil Rights Act specifically permitted professional development tests. Id. at 433.
However, the Court held that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's conclusion
that § 703(h) permitted only job related tests comported with congressional intent. Id. 43336. Therefore, the Supreme Court found that regardless of the employer's intent, the
challenged job requirements violated Title VII. Id. at 436.
229. Ortiz, 28 F.3d at 333-34 (Lewis, 3., dissenting).
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practice if plaintiffs could establish a disparate impact on minority voters.m
Thus, this model creates a rebuttable presumption that a section 2 violation
exists whenever the plaintiffs show a disparate impact. The Title VII model
contains the following elements:
1. Do historical and socioeconomic factors indicate a history of discrimination?
2. If so, according to Thornburg, presume a causal link between this
history of discrimination and current voting patterns.
3. Does the challenged practice operate with a disparate impact on
minority voters? (plaintiff's burden of proof)
4. Is the challenged practice necessary to achieve valid elections?
(defendant's burden of proof)
This approach places a significant burden squarely on the shoulders of
state and local government defendants in section 2 cases.3 A plaintiff's
burden is much lighter within this framework. Presenting evidence that
shows a history of discrimination in housing, education, and employment,
among other things, is not difficult for minority plaintiffs because the
existence of such past discrimination is well documented and, more
importantly, well accepted. Similarly, the burden to produce disparate
impact evidence on section 2 plaintiffs is also low Any voting practice that
affected minorities differently than whites might satisfy this threshold
requirement.
Voting rights litigation would become, under a Title VII model, almost
entirely dependent on social science data. Quite possibly, common, wellaccepted, and well-intentioned practices might fall victim to a section 2
challenge and a subsequent settlement because the cost of proving the
necessity of the practice might be prohibitive to some local governmental
units. For example, assume that a social science study showed that higher
numbers of minorities would vote if a city conducted voting on Mondays
rather than Tuesdays. The government would then bear the cost of showing
that Tuesday voting was necessary to ensure valid elections. This showing
would involve significant government resources and thus encourage state and
local governments to settle less important claims. In short, tis burden
230. See id. at 334 (suggesting that § 2 litigation be modeled after Title VII disparate
impact law).
231.
Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified at U.S.C.
§§ 1973-1973bb (1988)). Section 2 provides that "[n]o voting qualification or prerequisite
to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or
political subdivision
" Id. (emphasis added).
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shifting would give too much power to plaintiffs interested in frustrating the

administration of local government.
However, the analogy between Title VII and section 2 is not without
support. 2 A few courts have relied on Title VII cases in Voting Rights Act
cases and vice versa.
However, these courts have mxed the doctrines
only in discussing the history of discriunation.' Additionally, the legisla-

tive history of section 2 indicates that Congress did not intend for the Title
VII model to apply in the voting rights context. 5 Congress passed the
Voting Rights Act and the Civil Rights Act only one year apart. Congress
created a disparate impact model in the employment context, but chose not
to do so in the voting rights context. 6 Instead, Congress explicitly created
232. See Barnett v Daley, 32 F.3d 1196, 1202 (7th Cir. 1994) (discussing Title VII of
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and § 2 of Voting Rights Act of 1965). In a § 2 challenge to
Chicago's redistricting plan, Judge Posner wrote regarding the use of intent in § 2 cases:
[Intent] could still be usable to prove a violation that could not be inferred from
a discriminatory effect. That is the difference between disparate treatment and
disparate impact as theories of violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 - the former requiring proof of intentional discrimination, the latter merely
proof of an unreasonable though not necessarily an intended discriminatory
effect - and the dichotomy may have a parallel in the Voting Rights Act.
Id.
233. Cf. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971) (finding that even m
absence of discriminatory intent, employer must establish business necessity of challenged
practice); Barnett, 32 F.3d at 1202 (citing Title VII law to explain proof necessary for §.2
challenge under Voting Rights Act).
234. Cf. Gnggs, 401 U.S. at 430-31 (discussing history of discrimination against
minorities in education). The Griggs Court cited Gaston County v United States, 395 U.S.
285 (1969), a voting rights case, in discussing the history of discrimination against minorities
in education. Gnggs, 401 U.S. at 430. The Gaston Court analyzed the lingering effects of
the inferior educational opportunities available to minorities during segregation. Id.
235. Cf. S. REP No. 417, supra note 2, at 27, reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 205
(discussing the operation of amended § 2). "Plaintiffs must either prove [discriminatory]
intent, or,alternatively, must show [discriminatory] results." Id. (emphasis added) (citations
omitted). Tis language indicates congressional intent that results and intent claims represent
the exclusive methods of establishing a violation of § 2. The last factor that Congress
enumerated in Senate Report 417 arguably allows courts to consider a Title VII "lack of
business necessity" type of argument from § 2 plaintiffs. The Senate Report notes that
"[a]dditional factors that in some cases have had probative value as part of plaintiffs' evidence
[include] whether the policy underlying the state or political subdivision's use of such voting
qualification, prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or procedure is tenuous." Id. at
29, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 207 (emphasis added). Thus, while Congress
intended courts to consider the policy needs underlying a challenged practice, Senate Report
417 makes clear that plaintiffs bear this burden of proof.
236. See S. REP No. 417, supra note 2, at 27, reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 205
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a disparate results model.2 7 Had it intended for courts to adopt a Title VII
framework when analyzing section 2 cases, Congress easily could have
adopted such a model.

C. The Ortiz Plantiffs"Model
In Ortiz, both m the district court and before the Third Circuit, the
plaintiffs built their case around elements that the majority did not recognize
as proof of a section 2 violation." The plaintiffs attempted to establish a
history of discrimination m Philadelphia, the disparate impact of the
nonvoting purge law, and the existence of effective, less discriminatory
alternatives to the Philadelphia procedure. 9 The plaintiffs offered to establish that Philadelphia could achieve its legitimate objective of preventing
voter fraud by utilizing other methods that operate without the discriminatory
result of the current procedure. 2' Thus, the plaintiffs' model includes the
following elements:
1. Does exammation of the Senate factors indicate a history of discrimmation?
2. If so, according to Thornburg, presume a causal link between this
history of discrimination and current voting patterns.
3. Does the challenged practice interact with the history of discrimination established in step 1 to operate with a disparate impact on
minority voters?
4. Are there effective, less discriminatory alternatives to the current
practice?
This model is balanced and reflects the approach followed by courts
generally in section 2 episodic practice cases.2 ' For example, m Hams v
(writing that intent and results claims are exclusive method of establishing § 2 violation).
237
See Barnett v Daley, 32 F.3d 1196, 1202 (7th Cir. 1994) (discussing intent
requirement of Equal Protection Clause). The court wrote that "effects are all that matter
under the [Voting Rights] Act." Id.
238. Cf. Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 1, Ortiz (No. 93-1634) (outlining
plaintiffs' construction of § 2 cause of action challenging episodic practices).
239. Id.
240. Id. at 22-25.
241.
Cf.Mississippi State Chapter, Operation PUSH v Mabus, 932 F.2d 400, 404-05
(5th Cir. 1991) (upholding district court's conclusion that application of Senate factors indicates that Mississippi's registration procedures result in lower registration rate of blacks);
Hams v. Siegelman, 695 F Supp. 517, 528 (M.D. Ala. 1988) (requiring that plaintiffs show
that lower minority voting level is "in some measure attributable" to challenged practice);
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Siegelman 2 the district court made extensive findings regarding the Senate
factors and Alabama's history of discrimnation. 3 Both Hams and Brown
v Dean2" required very little evidence of causation. 245 In fact, the Dean
Court wrote that under section 2 the issue was whether the challenged practice may have the effect of inhibiting minonty voting 2 Certainly part three
of the plaintiffs' model comports with the view that the challenged practice
need only interact with other factors to cause a discriminatory result in

violation of section 2. Therefore, part three satisfies the low causation
requirements of Hams and Dean. Additionally, part four of the plaintiffs'
model is not unlike the approach taken by the PUSH courts.247 In that
challenge to Mississippi's dual registration procedures, the existence of less
discriminatory alternatives obviously influenced the Fifth Circuit's treatment
of the plaintiffs' section 2 claim." Thus, the Ortiz plaintiffs' model blends
the approaches of several section 2 cases challenging episodic practices.

This model appears most consistent with the legislative history of the
Voting Rights Act. The first and fourth parts of the plaintiffs' model are
similar to several factors enumerated in Senate Report 417 " Part one of
the plaintiffs' model requires examination of the Senate factors. Such an

examination is precisely how Congress intended courts to analyze section 2
cases.'

Additionally, the last factor enumerated m Senate Report 417

Brown v. Dean, 555 F Supp. 502, 505 (D.R.I. 1982) (finding that city's location of polling
places interacted with lower rates of minority automobile ownership and lack of public
transportation to deter minority voting in violation of § 2).
242. See supra notes 201-05 and accompanying text (discussing Hams).
243. See Harris, 695 F Supp. at 521-26 (recounting Alabama's history of efforts to
reduce political participation of minorities).
244. See supra notes 197-200 and accompanying text (discussing Dean).
245. Cf. Hams, 695 F Supp. at 529 (requiring that plaintiffs show that lower minority
voting level is attributable in part to challenged practice); Brown, 555 F Supp. at 504
(finding that socioeconomic factors interacted with city's location of polling places to reduce
minority voting in violation of § 2).
246. Brown, 555 F Supp. at 505.
247
Cf. Mississippi State Chapter, Operation PUSH v Mabus, 932 F.2d 400, 407-09
(5th Cir. 1991) (holding that less discriminatory legislative plan did not violate § 2).
248. Id.
249. See S. REP No. 417, supra note 2, at 28-29, reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
206-07 (discussing typical factors probative of § 2 violation).
250. See id. at 29 n.118, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N at 207 (discussing use of
enumerated Senate factors in § 2 cases). Senate Report 417 states that the typical factors are
not a mechanical test, but "require the court's overall judgment, based on the totality of the
circumstances and guided by those relevant factors in the particular case, of whether the
voting strength of minority voters is
'minimized or cancelled out.'" Id.

1106

52 WASH. & LEE L. REV 1065 (1995)

supports the fourth part of the plaintiffs' model." s The plaintiffs believed
that an examination of reasonable, less discriminatory alternatives appropriately measured equality 2 Similarly, Senate Report 417 suggests that
evidence showing the tenuous nature of the policy underlying a challenged
practice is probative of a section 2 violation." These two inquiries overlap.
Determining the reasonableness of an alternative plan necessarily requires
that courts examine the state interest supporting the original challenged
practice. Thus, the plaintiffs' model is a supportable interpretation of both
Senate Report 417 and section 2 episodic practices cases.
V Conclusion

One might question the importance of Ortiz to future voting rights
litigation" in light of passage of the National Voter Registration Act (the
Motor Voter Act). 255 This Act prohibits nonvoting purge statutes in all
federal elections. 6 States can continue to enforce nonvoting purge laws,
however, with respect to state elections, although such a practice would
require that registrars maintain two registration lists.' Thus, given the high

cost of maintaining separate registration lists for federal and state elections,
251. Cf. id. at 29, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N at 207 (discussing importance of
policy underlying practice challenged under § 2).
252. See Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 4, Ortiz (No. 93-1634) (arguing that less
discriminatory alternatives establish causation in § 2 cases). Plaintiffs wrote that:
There must be a measure of equal political opportunity and that measure is always
provided by proof, as here, of reasonable, less discriminatory alternatives. Just
as the less discriminatory alternatives of majority non-white single-member
districts in the context of a challenge to a discriminatory multimember district
election system provides the measure of equal political opportunity by which to
determine liability, here, the less discriminatory alternative of [a] mail purge
provide the measure of equal political
system as well as other systems
opportunity by which to determine liability Plaintiffs' proof here of less
discriminatory alternatives demonstrates a denial of equal political opportunity
Id.
253. See S. REP No. 417, supra note 2, at 29, repnnted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 207
(finding that tenuous nature of policy underlying challenged practice is probative of § 2
violation).
254. See Ortiz, 28 F.3d at 335 (Lewis, J., dissenting) (discussing impact of Ortiz).
255. National Voter Registration Act, Pub. L. No. 103-31, 107 Stat. 77 (1993) (codified
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973gg to 1973gg-10 (Supp. V 1993)).
256. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(b) (Supp. V 1993).
257 See Ortiz, 28 F.3d at 346 n.40 (Lewis, J., dissenting) (discussing impact of Motor
Voter Act).
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the Motor Voter Act will effectively eliminate the use of nonvoting purge
statutes. However, as the Ortiz dissent indicated, the elimination of
nonvoting purge laws does not lessen the importance of this case.258 Because
purge laws are merely one type of voting practice, the majority's erroneous
construction of section 2 will misdirect future efforts to apply properly the
Voting Rights Act.' 9 In short, the Motor Voter Act will neither diminish
the precedential effect of Ortiz nor clarify the uncertainty surrounding
section 2.
Among the three models for the section 2 cause of action challenging
episodic practices illustrated by Ortiz, the courts should adopt the plaintiffs'
disparate impact model. The Ortiz majority's model is simply an insupportable interpretation of section 2. On almost no conceivable basis could
plaintiffs satisfy the Ortiz court's stringent threshold requirements in an
episodic practices case. The Title VII model, on the other hand, is more
favorable to section 2 plaintiffs - probably too favorable. By shifting much
of the burden from plaintiffs to defendants, the Title VII model's proposed
cure is worse than the disease. Such burden shifting creates an incentive for
frivolous suits and threatens to make section 2 litigation too dependent on
social science data. Thus, the plaintiffs' model represents the most fair and
balanced approach to the difficult problems presented by section 2 challenges
to episodic practices. However, regardless of which approach the courts
adopt, Ortiz makes apparent both the uncertainty that exists concerning the
elements of a plaintiff's section 2 cause of action and the need for courts to
address the issue.
At the very least, the disagreement between the majority and the dissent
over the language from Salas illustrates the difficultly inherent in attempting
to apply vote dilution standards to cases involving episodic practices.'
Because the facts giving rise to the two actions are so dissimilar, 6 ' courts
should recognize a bright-line distinction between the proof necessary in the
vote dilution context and that necessary in the context of episodic practices.
Although no court has explicitly employed a vote dilution/episodic practices
258. Id. at 346.
259. See id. at 335 n.26 (discussing importance of Ortiz).
260. Cf. Ortiz v. City of Phila. Office of the City Comm'rs Voter Registration Div., 824
F Supp. 514, 523 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (distinguishing episodic practices and vote dilution);
Harris v Siegelman, 695 F Supp. 517, 528 (M.D. Ala. 1988) (same).
261. See Ortiz, 28 F.3d at 331-32 (Lewis, T., dissenting) (discussing difference between
episodic practices and vote dilution). Judge Lewis wrote that "this is not a vote dilution case,
and I have already explained why the factors that are most relevant in that context are of little
if any relevance here." Id. at 341.
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dichotomy, such a distinction would remove much confusion regarding a
plaintiff's prima facie case.
Justice Cardozo lectured on the judicial process and considered the
responsibility of judges when faced with confusion in the law Cardozo
wrote that:
[L]ogic, and history, and custom, and utility, and the accepted standards
of right conduct, are the forces which singly or m combination shape the
progress of the law Which of these forces shall dominate in any case,
must depend largely upon the comparative importance or value of the
social interests that will be thereby promoted or mpaired. One of the
most fundamental social interests is that law shall be uniform and
impartial. There must be nothing m its action that savors of prejudice or
favor or even arbitrary whim or fitfulness. [The judge] legislates only
between gaps. He fills the open spaces in the law
[W]ithm the
confines of these open spaces and-those of precedent and tradition, choice
moves with a freedom which stamps its action as creative
The law
which is the resulting product is not found, but made.262
When Judge Posner, one of our most respected jurists, proclaims, "[w]e
wish we knew exactly what a plaintiff must prove in order to prevail under
the Voting Rights Act," 3 it becomes apparent that the law is in dire need of
clarification.

262. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 112-16 (1921)
(citations omitted).
263. Barnett v Daley, 32 F.3d 1196, 1201 (7th Cir. 1994).

